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Abstract 
 
The impact of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Standard on 
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters has a significant impact 
on Financial Institutions globally. This paper aims to critically evaluate the current South 
African legislation and the obligations it places on financial institutions. The research also 
highlights the challenges faced by a financial institutions in interpreting and implementing the 
often complex requirements of the regulations with a particular focus on the following areas 
namely customer on-boarding and enhanced due diligence procedures, monitoring of 
accounts, remediation of the existing customer base, system development, and reporting to 
the South African Revenue Service. The research also looks into the readiness of developing 
countries in implementing the Automatic Exchange of Information. The research concludes 
with a discussion into the appropriateness of South Africa’s decision to agree to be one of the 
early adopters of this legislation despite the challenges identified above.  
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List of key abbreviations: 
The following is a list of key abbreviations used in this report: 
AEOI Automatic Exchange of Information 
AML Anti Money Laundering 
BRS Business Requirement Specification 
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FATCA Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
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KYC Know Your Customer 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1. Background and context of the study 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD (n.d, (a)), 
the new global standard on Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) reduces the possibility 
for tax evasion. It provides for the exchange of non-resident financial account information with 
the tax authorities in the account holders’ country of residence. Participating jurisdictions that 
implement AEOI send and receive pre-agreed information each year, without having to send a 
specific request. AEOI will enable the discovery of formerly undetected tax evasion.  It will 
enable governments to recover tax revenue lost to non-compliant taxpayers, and will further 
strengthen international efforts to increase transparency, cooperation, and accountability 
among financial institutions and tax administrations. Additionally, AEOI will generate 
secondary benefits by increasing voluntary disclosures of concealed assets and by encouraging 
taxpayers to report all relevant information. These secondary benefits will largely be achieved 
through the implementation of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) Special Voluntary 
Disclosure Programme (SVDP). South African taxpayers who have undisclosed foreign assets 
and income will now have an opportunity to declare these to SARS and pay the resultant taxes 
resulting in previously lost revenue being recouped. These non-compliant taxpayers no longer 
have a choice as the foreign tax jurisdiction in which these income generating assets are 
housed will now be sharing such information with SARS. Further benefits to the fiscus of other 
early adopter countries of the Standard are discussed in chapter six of this paper. 
In South Africa, AEOI will be achieved through the implementation of the OECD Standard for 
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (the Standard) which 
encompasses the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). This piece of legislation places an 
obligation on all FIs to identify and monitor reportable accounts and reportable persons that 
are foreign tax residents through the implementation of various enhanced due diligence 
procedures. This will amongst other things involve the need to enhance existing on-boarding 
procedures for new/potential account holders in order for the Financial Institution (FI) to 
collect the tax and residency information for all account holders. This will assist the FI to 
determine if the account holder could potentially be tax residents or have tax obligations in 
foreign jurisdictions, run remediation programmes with the existing base of account holders as 
well as develop reporting capabilities in-house to ensure compliance.  
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This paper examines the real life implementation of the Standard in a FI that specialises in the 
areas of trust administration and fiduciary advice. It highlights the challenges and additional 
considerations faced by the FI in interpreting and implementing the requirements of the 
Standard. A best practice approach is also suggested for a FI in order to implement these 
requirements into their day-to day activities thereby ensuring compliance and avoiding the 
associated financial and reputational risks of non-compliance. 
2. The research problem 
2.1 Statement of the problem 
Whilst the Standard is fairly detailed as to the requirements it places on a FI, there is very 
limited guidance for the FI as to how it can best achieve these obligations in an operationally 
efficient and cost effective manner. FIs are left to their own will in determining a best fit 
solution.  
The problem that therefore arises is in the absence of a suggested approach to 
implementation from a regulatory authority such as SARS, how would a South African FI go 
about implementing these requirements into their day-to-day operational activities whilst 
ensuring they are fully compliant with the Standard and what loopholes exist with the 
Standard? South African FIs that have yet to implement the Standard can use this report as a 
guide in assisting them with implementation. 
2.2 The Sub-Problems 
2.2.1 In the absence of a suggested approach, what would be the best starting point for a FI 
in determining a best fit solution and what can that solution be? 
Prior to the development and design of an operational process a FI will have to establish inter 
alia the requirements of the Standard that must be complied with. The problem will be 
examined through a thorough review of the Standard with a specific focus on 
a) Due-diligence requirements for the various account/product types; 
b) Key definitions that will be applicable to the FI. 
This examination will help a FI better understand the applicability of the Standard on its 
operations and will enable the groundwork for an appropriate solution that will address 
requirements for both new and existing customers to be considered. 
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2.2.2  What are the complimentary aspects required for successful implementation that will 
also need to be considered by a FI but which are not covered in the Standard? And how 
should a FI approach these in order to ensure compliance? 
The problem here is that there are additional issues that are not specifically covered in the 
Standard that will also need to be considered by a FI in implementing the Standard. FIs are left 
to establish these on their own and could potentially only realise the impact later on in the 
implementation or worse, overlook them completely. 
The key items that will be examined here amongst others include: 
a) Budgeting and cost considerations of implementation; 
b) Updating of customer documentation and collection of relevant taxpayer information; 
c) The identification of key risks and the design of mitigating controls; and 
d) Other matters which are necessary for the successful overall implementation of the 
Standard. 
2.2.3 What loopholes exist in the Standard in its current format for tax evaders and how are 
they used? And what are the challenges and benefits faced in other developing countries in 
implementing the Standard? 
Whilst the OECD submits that implementation of the Standard will result in benefits to 
adopting countries, there are aspects that could erode any benefits derived from early 
adoption. These include: 
a) Tax evaders using loopholes on the Standard to avoid being reported under the CRS and; 
b) Challenges with CRS implementation faced by other early adopters that are considered 
developing countries. 
2.3 Significance of the study 
As the world becomes increasingly globalised it is becoming easier for all taxpayers to make, 
hold and manage investments through financial institutions outside of their country of 
residence. Vast amounts of money are kept offshore and go untaxed to the extent that 
taxpayers fail to comply with tax obligations in their home jurisdiction. Offshore tax evasion is 
a serious problem for jurisdictions all over the world, OECD and non‐OECD, small and large, 
developing and developed countries. Countries have a shared interest in maintaining the 
integrity of their tax systems. Cooperation between tax administrations is critical in the fight 
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against tax evasion and in protecting the integrity of tax systems. A key aspect of that 
cooperation is the exchange of information. (OECD, 2014(a): 5) 
 
The SARS reporting Business Requirements Specification requires that FIs report on the various 
income categories types such as interest, rentals, dividends and other income amongst other 
information. This will provide great insight into the various income generating assets like fixed 
properties, investments etc. held by a taxpayer in a foreign jurisdiction that they have not 
disclosed to their resident tax authority.  
 
AEOI is broadly recognised to be a positive step for global transparency. Although support for 
AEOI is widespread, developing countries share a concern as to how to achieve practical 
implementation. For successful implementation of AEOI, the requirements include knowledge, 
political will, information technology, human resources, legal frameworks, rigorous 
confidentiality, data protection safeguards and resources dedicated to ensuring the 
information received is put to effective use. Many developing countries currently lack capacity 
in these areas, and are facing competing tax reform priorities. (OECD, 2014(b): 3) 
 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) [in South Africa and abroad] has demonstrated 
that FIs face an uphill struggle to implement complex regulatory programmes in a short 
timeframe. The implementation calendar currently envisaged for the CRS means this will have 
to be implemented in a much shorter timeframe than for FATCA. There are fundamental 
differences between CRS and FATCA, with the result that large FIs have substantial IT projects 
to plan, budget for, build/source and roll out – all of this in a very short space of time. 
Ultimately, if the reporting is rushed, the quality of data that governments will be exchanging 
will be lacking. (European Union, 2015: 6) 
 
While it is admirable that South Africa is one of the tax jurisdictions leading the way in this 
effort, consideration must be given as to whether or not FIs in a developing country is ready 
and capable to handle this significant responsibility.  
 
The research will provide insight into the various legislative requirements of the Standard. It 
aims to promote a greater degree of understanding of the Standard considering the limited 
guidance given especially in the field of trust administration. The research will highlight 
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practical challenges faced by FIs in implementing the Standard and demonstrate the most 
effective manner available in order to meet the 2017 deadline for FIs submitting reports to 
SARS and in turn allowing SARS to share the information with other participating tax 
jurisdictions.  The research can then serve as a reference point for any FI dealing with clients 
who are impacted by these regulations. The challenges identified will however, help all FIs 
identify common pitfalls that may be experienced with the implementation of the Standard 
and can help contribute to a revision of existing regulations to consider the more practical 
solutions to assist a FI with compliance.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
The research method adopted is of a qualitative, interpretive nature, and is based on a 
detailed interpretation and analysis of amongst other things, the relevant pieces of legislation 
that pertain to the Standard and other aspects of tax and trust administration as well as 
supporting guidance material published by the OECD. In addition some of the findings 
highlighted are sourced from international tax forums and institutes. The core of the research 
however is based on actual findings from CRS implementation in a FI. This also includes a 
quantitative analysis on the costs associated with implementing this piece of legislation. 
 
4. Limitations of the study 
 
The study will answer the problem statement and sub-problems listed above, but the following 
have been identified as limitations: 
a) This research is restricted to an analysis of the requirements of the Standard insofar as it 
pertains to the CRS and therefore does not cover any regulations pertaining to FATCA 
(although references may be made to this separate piece of legislation).  
b) The Standard is quite comprehensive, however, only sections and definitions relevant to 
the application of the Standard in a trust administration business will be discussed. A trust 
administration business in this context refers to a FI which serves in the capacity of 
corporate trustee as well as manages the day to day affairs of the trust. 
Whilst the research will highlight the more complex areas of implementation within a FI, it 
cannot necessarily be applied across all FIs given the diversity of product categories and 
customer types that exist within the various FIs in South Africa. 
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5. Chapter Outline 
5.1 Chapter One – Introduction 
This chapter will provide the background to the topic and introduce the issues that will be 
studied. It will include the research problem and sub-problems, research methodology, scope 
and limitations. 
5.2 Chapter Two – The key areas of the Standard explained 
This chapter will provide an overview of the key regulations as contained in the Standard. 
These include the due-diligence requirements and key definitions. The due-diligence 
procedures are further analysed as these are applied differently depending on the monetary 
value of the account and the customer type (i.e. existing customer versus new customer and 
individual account holder versus entity account holder). 
 
5.3 Chapter Three – A suggested solution for implementing the Standard into a FI 
This chapter will identify through the use of procedure guidelines, a suggested solution to the 
successful implementation of the Standard in a FI. The solution discussed here has been 
implemented in an actual FI in South Africa and is designed as per the regulations discussed in 
chapter two. The focal point will be around the specific requirements that apply to trust 
entities and their related parties. In addition to this the associated risks and control measures 
at each critical step in the process will be highlighted and discussed. 
 
5.4 Chapter Four – Additional requirements and other practical considerations of CRS 
implementation 
This chapter will explore other key factors that will need to be considered by a FI in fulfilling 
the requirements identified in chapter three. Some of the key areas for discussion will include 
the updating of on-boarding documentation to include the self-certification documents, the 
remediation exercise on existing customer base, staff and customer impact, system 
enhancements to include all relevant CRS reporting fields and finally the building of a report to 
SARS. It will also highlight certain areas of the regulations that do not provide guidelines on the 
more complex account types such as Trust entities and have also been adapted from learnings 
of CRS implementation in a South African FI. 
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5.5 Chapter Five – Cost considerations of CRS implementation in a FI 
This chapter explores the costs of implementing CRS in a FI. General cost considerations will be 
highlighted first. The various cost driving functions of the areas in a FI involved in the overall 
CRS project will be analysed and a charge out rate will be assigned to each to provide an 
overall estimated cost figure. The charge out rates and costing activities has all been sourced 
from the implementation of CRS in a South African FI. Ways of reducing these costs will also be 
recommended. 
 
5.6 Chapter Six – Benefits and challenges faced by developing tax jurisdictions with CRS 
implementation 
This chapter examines the overall readiness of developing tax jurisdictions in implementing the 
AEOI. This will include an investigation into challenges faced as well as the benefits to be 
derived by these tax jurisdictions. It will also explore some of the reasons that could have 
prompted South Africa’s National Treasury to sign on as early adopters. 
 
5.7 Chapter Seven - Loopholes and possible ways to escape the net of CRS 
This chapter explores some the methods and means tax evaders may be tempted to use to 
avoid being reported under the CRS. The OECD standard in its current format has loopholes 
and perceived ambiguities in the OECD standard. Understanding these loopholes is necessary 
to consider as it will directly impact the quality and accuracy of financial information that will 
be shared by both adopting and non/late-adopting jurisdictions.  
5.8 Chapter Eight – Conclusion 
This chapter will conclude with a summary of recommendations based on the findings in 
earlier chapters.  
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Chapter Two: The key areas of the Standard explained  
Literature Review 
The OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters as 
published in the Government Gazette on 2 March 2016 provides the best starting point in 
research of this nature. Without an analysis of this piece of legislation one cannot determine 
the minimum requirements that will need to be implemented by a FI to ensure compliance. 
The South African Revenue Service also published its Business Requirement Specification (BRS) 
for the Automatic Exchange of Information. This document provides great insight into the type 
of information that will need to be reported to SARS and ultimately plays an important role in 
the design of the customer documentation that is required to collect such information.  In 
addition, each tax jurisdiction will have its own unique set of legislation and reporting 
requirements so these are currently the only documents available detailing the Standard in a 
South African context 
The OECD is at the forefront of improving the economic and social well-being of people around 
the world by providing platform for inter-governmental cooperation. Given that AEOI is the 
concept of the OECD it is necessary to analyse their publications as it provides great insight as 
to the reasons and benefits to be derived by tax jurisdictions who agree to share information 
as well as the challenges faced by implementing jurisdictions. They have also published useful 
guidelines on how FIs should design customer documentation. 
The Tax Justice Network (TJN) is an independent international network launched in 2003. They 
are dedicated to high-level research, analysis and advocacy in the area of international tax and 
the international aspects of financial regulation. TJN maps, analyses and explains the roles of 
tax and the harmful impacts of tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax competition and tax havens. The 
world of offshore tax havens is a particular focus of their work. Their core goals include 
creating understanding and debate and to promote reform, especially in poorer countries (Tax 
Justice Network, n.d). It is imperative to consider findings of research conducted by 
organisations such as this one as it provides a view that is independent to that of the OECD as 
to the perceived benefits to and challenges faced by developing countries implementing AEOI.  
 
Another aspect that may be overlooked by FIs is the concept of privacy of customer 
information. This is of significant importance now especially with the Protection of Personal 
Information Act being legislated in South Africa. A FI must be careful to protect themselves 
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against possible lawsuits from customers who feel their information may be used in a way 
other than for its intended purpose. Phillip Baker QC (2016) a practicing barrister and senior 
visiting research fellow at London University has published a research paper on The Rights to 
confidentiality and privacy in an age of transparency: A European perspective and aspects of 
his research are considered useful in this discussion. 
 
Given that the Standard casts a net that is rapidly closing around tax evaders, there will 
certainly be scrambling on the part of these errant taxpayers to utilise any loopholes to avoid 
being reported to their respective tax jurisdictions in which they are resident. Some of the 
methods that may be used are discussed in a report entitled ‘The 24 OECD Common Reporting 
Standard Loopholes’ as published by Mark Morris. Mark Morris has been recognised by the EU 
Commission for his valuable exchange of views on the EU Savings Tax Directive Amendments 
since 2005. He currently advises several competent authorities on the misapplication in their 
official guidelines concerning AEOI.   
 
Finally, aspects from articles published by international audit and tax advisory firm KPMG 
(2016) as well Fenergo (2016) are referred to as they provide concise summaries to support 
requirements that need to be considered by a FI before implementing the Standard. 
Definitions are also sourced from the following: West’s Encyclopaedia of American Law, Collins 
Dictionary of Law, BusinessDictionary.com and the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1998. 
The core areas of the Standard that are relevant to the FI used in the case study will be 
discussed. These include: 
 General reporting and due diligence requirements; 
 Due diligence processes for individual accounts which include the identification, review 
and remediation of pre-existing individual accounts as well as the on-boarding of new 
individual accounts; 
 Due diligence processes for entity accounts which include the identification, review and 
remediation of pre-existing entity accounts as well as the on-boarding of new entity 
accounts and; 
 A change in circumstance for both individual and entity accounts. 
 
The due diligence procedures discussed below have been adapted from the Standard as 
contained in the Government Gazette, Republic of South Africa, No 10573, Vol. 609, 2 March 
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2016, The OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax 
Matters (with the relevant section numbers included) unless otherwise stated. Refer to 
Appendix A for all the key definitions contained in this report. 
 
General reporting and due diligence requirements (s. I, Para. (A – F)) 
The client information to be reported, and exchanged between relevant revenue authorities, 
includes the following information (as it relates to each reportable account of each reportable 
person that is an account holder): 
 Client name; 
 Address; 
 Jurisdictions of residence; 
 Tax identification number (may not be required under certain circumstances); 
 Date of birth – individuals only (may not be required under certain circumstances); 
 Place of birth – individuals only; 
 Country of birth; 
 The account number; 
 The account balance or value at the end of the relevant reporting period; 
 In relation to closed account, the balance as at one day before the closure of the account; 
 The total gross amount of interest; 
 The total gross amount of dividends; 
 The total gross amount of other income generated with respect to assets held in the 
account; 
 The total gross proceeds from the sale or redemption of Financial Assets paid or credited 
to the account during the reporting period with respect to which the Reporting Financial 
Institution acted as custodian, broker, nominee, or otherwise as an agent for the account 
holder and, 
 The information must identify the currency in which each amount is denominated (KPMG, 
2016). 
In addition to the above the Standard also requires that all Reporting FIs must establish, 
maintain and document due diligence procedures that are designed to identify reportable 
accounts, which procedures must identify the jurisdiction in which an account holder or a 
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controlling person is resident for the purposes of any tax imposed by the law of that 
jurisdiction and apply the due diligence procedures set out in the Standard. (s.II, Para. A, ss.1) 
A financial account is treated as a reportable account beginning as of the date it is identified as 
such pursuant to the due diligence procedures in the relevant sections of the Standard and, 
unless otherwise provided, information with respect to a reportable account must be reported 
annually in the period following the reporting period to which the information relates. (s. II, 
Para. A, ss. 2)  
 
The balance or value of an account is determined as of the last day of the reporting period, 
unless it is not possible or usual to value a specific type of account at that date in which case 
the value at the normal valuation date for such account that is nearest to the last day of 
February in that reporting period, must be used. (s. II, Para. B) 
 
Where a balance or value threshold is to be determined as of the last day of the reporting 
period, the relevant balance or value must be determined as of the last day of the reporting 
period that ends with or within that reporting period. (s. II, Para. C) 
 
Reporting FIs may use service providers to fulfil the reporting and due diligence obligations 
imposed on such reporting FIs, but these obligations remain the responsibility of the Reporting 
FIs. (s. II, Para. D) 
 
A Reporting FI may apply the due diligence procedures for: 
 New financial accounts to all pre-existing financial accounts or with respect to any clearly 
identified group of pre-existing financial accounts, but the rules otherwise applicable to 
such pre-existing financial accounts continue to apply (s. II, Para. E, ss. 1); and 
 High value financial accounts to all lower value financial accounts or with respect to any 
clearly identified group of lower value financial accounts (s. II, Para. E, ss. 2) 
 
Due diligence processes for identification, review and remediation of pre-existing individual 
accounts 
The Standard stipulates different review procedures that must be carried out by the FIs on 
individual financial accounts in order to identify if the account holder/s are reportable persons.  
Prior to the commencement of these procedures the FI will first need to categorise the 
17 
 
financial accounts into high value and low value accounts. The due diligence procedures that 
need to be applied differ depending on which category the financial account falls into. 
For the purposes of determining the aggregate balance or value of financial accounts held, by 
an individual account holder the FI must apply the following rules:  
 All financial accounts maintained by a FI for an individual account holder will be required 
to be aggregated. (i.e. the sum total will need to be determined).  
 All financial accounts held by a related entity for an individual account holder (e.g. 
different divisions within the same FI) must also be included in this aggregated total. This 
will only need to be done if the FIs computerised systems on which the account 
information is maintained have a direct link to the financial systems of the related entity 
by reference to a data element (e.g. client or account number). (s. VII, Para. C, ss. 1) 
 A special aggregation rule is also applicable to RMs within a FI. In the case of any financial 
accounts that a Relationship Manager (RM) knows, or has reason to know, are directly or 
indirectly owned, controlled, or established (other than in a fiduciary capacity) by the 
same account holder, all such accounts should be aggregated in determining the overall 
financial account balances of that account holder. (s. VII, Para. C, ss. 3) 
 
All currency conversions must be translated at a rate of R15: $1. The rand value of the high 
value financial account threshold mentioned above is therefore R 15,000,000 ($ 1,000,000) (s. 
VII, Para. C, ss. 4(b)) 
Due Diligence on pre-existing low value individual accounts  
FIs are given an option when it comes to the identification, remediation and reporting of low 
value individual accounts: 
 FIs that have documentary evidence of the current residential address of the individual 
account holder may treat that account holder as being a tax resident in the foreign 
jurisdiction based on the residential address as specified on the relevant documentation. 
(s. III, Para. B, ss. 1) 
 If the FI does not collect the residential addresses of its account holders then it must 
electronically search for indicia on their databases.  
 The indicia that will need to be searched for are as follows (s. III, Para. B, ss. 2(a-f)): 
 Evidence of the individual account holder as a resident of a reportable jurisdiction; 
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 The current mailing or residential address (including a post office box) of the 
account holder is located in a reportable jurisdiction; 
 The account holder has one or more telephone numbers in a reportable 
jurisdiction and no number in the jurisdiction of the reporting financial institution; 
 The account holder has standing instructions (or more commonly referred to a 
scheduled payment) to transfer funds to a financial account that is maintained in a 
reportable jurisdiction; 
 The account holder has granted power of attorney or signatory authority to a 
person who has an address in a reportable jurisdiction or; 
 The account holder has specified a hold mail/care-of address of a person in a 
reportable jurisdiction. 
 
 If no indicia is found by the FI using an electronic search of its database then no further 
action is required by that FI until a change in circumstance of the account holder occurs 
(this will be discussed in detail later in this chapter). (s. III, Para. B, ss. 3) 
 Should indicia be found, the individual account holder will be requested to complete a tax 
residency self-certification form to establish their tax residence/ies.  If the account holder 
does not provide the self-certification form as requested by the FI, he/she will be 
reported to SARS as undocumented and may be subject to administrative penalties. If the 
account holder does provide a self-certification form then the FI must apply a 
reasonableness test on that self-certification form. The test is necessary as the Standard 
prevents a FI from accepting any self-certification forms or documentary evidence which 
is known to contain errors or where the FI has reasonable doubt over the validity of the 
information supplied in the self-certification forms. (s. III, Para. B, ss. 4) 
 A reasonability test is a comparison of the account holder’s tax residency declared at on-
boarding versus what was subsequently declared on the self-certification form referred to 
above. This information used to conduct this test can be sourced using documents 
collected for KYC/AML purposes, information that is publically available or information 
obtained during interviews with the account holders. Should discrepancies be identified 
between these sources of information and the self-certification forms, the FI will have to 
re-confirm the accuracy of the information supplied by the account holder in order to 
determine its accuracy. (s. VII, Para. A) 
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 A FI is required to review, remediate all pre-existing low value individual accounts by 28th 
February 2018. (s. III, Para. D) 
Due diligence on high value pre-existing individual accounts 
The due diligence procedures of high and low value pre-existing individual accounts are 
principally the same; however, the Standard does contain a few additional requirements when 
it comes to the treatment of high value pre-existing individual accounts. 
 The electronic search for indicia is the same as discussed for the low value accounts above, 
however in the case of high value accounts the electronic search is only allowed if the 
front end system used for the capturing and storing of account holder information caters 
for all of the following fields: 
 The individual account holder’s residence status, residential and mailing address, 
telephone number/s, details of standing instructions to transfer funds to an account in a 
reportable jurisdiction, details of a care of/hold mail address in a reportable jurisdiction 
and details of Power of Attorney/Signatory of a person in a reportable jurisdiction. These 
are the same fields that are used for the indicia check above. (s. III, Para. C, ss. 1) 
If all of the above fields aren’t available then it will be necessary for the FI to search for indicia 
using the paper based search.  
 The paper based search (for documents not older than 5 years) includes a review of 
the current customer master file, the most recent documentary evidence collected 
with respect to the financial account, the most recent account opening contract or 
documentation, the most recent documentation obtained by the FI pursuant to 
AML/KYC procedures or for other regulatory purposes, any Power of Attorney or 
signature authority forms, and any standing instructions to transfer funds currently in 
effect. (s. III, Para. C, ss. 2(a-e)) 
 A RM (or Client Liaison Officer (CLO)) declaration is required to be signed for all high 
value individual accounts regardless of whether indicia are discovered on these 
financial accounts or not. The CLO declaration essentially confirms that to the best of 
the RM knowledge the information supplied by the account holder is correct. This 
must be done on an annual basis for any financial accounts that fall into this category. 
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The CLO declaration applies only to individual and not entity account holders or their 
controlling persons. (s. III, Para. C, ss. 4). 
The review of all high value accounts must be completed by 28th February 2017. (s. III, Para. D). 
Due diligence procedures for new individual accounts 
The Standard requires that for all new individual accounts the FI must (s. IV, Para. A-D):  
 Obtain from the account holder a tax residency self-certification upon account 
opening/on-boarding of the financial account  
 The self-certification form received from the customer should also undergo a 
reasonableness test by comparing it to other information collected at the point of on-
boarding (e.g. KYC and AML documentation). 
 If after applying the test above, the FI cannot place any reliance on the self-certification 
then a new self-certification must be requested from the account holder.  
 If the self-certification received from the account holder indicates that they are a tax 
resident in a foreign jurisdiction/s then that financial account and the related account 
holder must be treated as a reportable person for the purposes of CRS. 
 If the self-certification received from the account holder indicates that they are not a tax 
resident in a foreign jurisdiction/s then neither the financial account nor the related 
account holder should be reported to SARS (This would imply that the account holder is or 
should be a tax resident in South Africa). The account will remain a non-reportable account 
until such time that a change in circumstance occurs.                                                                     
Identification, review and remediation of pre-existing entity accounts 
Pre-existing entity accounts that are not required to be reviewed/identified or reported 
Due diligence procedures will have to be performed on all pre-existing entity accounts that 
have a financial account with an aggregate balance in excess of $ 250,000  No choice is given in 
this regard. (s. V, Para. B)  
A pre-existing entity account with an aggregate account balance of less than $ 250,000 as of 
29th February 2016 does not have to be identified, reviewed or reported by the FI under the 
regulations of the Standard. This rule is however flexible and ultimately at the discretion of the 
FI who may elect rather to perform due diligence procedures across all pre-existing entity 
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accounts regardless of whether the aggregate account balance is below $ 250,000. (s. V, Para. 
A) 
The financial account balance rules for entity accounts are similar to those discussed for 
individual accounts. All financial accounts maintained by a FI for an entity account holder will 
be required to be aggregated. (I.e. the sum total of all accounts will need to be determined). 
All financial accounts held by a related entity’s for an entity account holder (E.g. different 
divisions within the same FI) must also be included in this aggregated total. This will only need 
to be done if the FI’s computerised systems on which the account information is maintained 
have a direct link to the financial systems of the related entity by reference to a data element 
(e.g. client or account number) (s. VII, Para. C, ss. 2). The special aggregation rule for RMs also 
applies to entity accounts. 
A pre-existing entity account (together with the controlling persons identified) will ONLY 
become reportable under the Standard if: 
 The entity who is the account holder has one or more controlling persons who is a 
reportable person or 
 The entity who is the account holder meets the definition of a Passive NFE and has one 
or more controlling persons who are reportable persons or 
 The entity who is the account holder has no reportable controlling persons but has a 
place of incorporation/organisation/effective management or has an address or 
telephone number in a reportable jurisdiction 
In order to determine whether or not a pre-existing entity account will be considered a 
reportable financial account the following due diligence procedures will need to be applied:  
Determining whether or not a pre-existing entity account is a reportable financial account: 
 The FI must review all information maintained for regulatory or customer relationship 
purposes (e.g. KYC/AML documentation) to make this determination.  
 If upon inspection of the documentation it is identified that the entity who is the 
account holder has on record a place of incorporation, organisation, place of effective 
management, an address or telephone number in a reportable jurisdiction then that 
financial account will become reportable under the CRS.(s. V, Para. D, ss. 1(a)) 
 The financial account will remain reportable unless the FI obtains a tax residency self-
certification form from the account holder or reasonably determines based on 
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information in its possession or that is publicly available which proves that the 
financial account is not reportable. (s. V, Para. D, ss. 1(b)). 
 
Determining whether or not a pre-existing entity is a Passive NFE with one or more 
controlling persons: 
 It must first be determined if the entity who is the account holder meets the definition 
of a Passive NFE. This determination must be made through the use of a self-
certification form completed by authorised persons of the entity unless the FI has 
information on hand which could indicate that the entity is in fact not classified as a 
Passive NFE and thus not reportable. (s. V, Para. D, ss. 2(a)) 
 The controlling persons of the entity must then be identified. This can be achieved 
using information collected during KYC/AML procedures. The same indicia checks 
discussed under the due-diligence procedures for individual account holders can be 
applied to determine if the controlling persons of entities are reportable persons. If 
the aggregate balance of a pre-existing entity financial account is less than $ 
1,000,000, the information collected and maintained as part of the AML/KYC 
procedures can be checked for indicia. However, should the aggregate financial 
account balance be greater than or equal to $ 1,000,000 then it will be necessary for 
the FI to obtain a tax residency self-certification form from the controlling persons of 
that entity. (s. V, Para. D, ss. 2(b-c)) 
 
Due diligence for new entity accounts: 
 The due diligence procedures for new entity accounts and their related controlling 
persons (i.e. accounts opened on/after 1 March 2016), are essentially the same as 
those for the pre-existing accounts. The key distinction however is that the Standard 
requires the appropriate tax residency self-certification forms to be collected from 
both the entity who is the account holder and the controlling persons at the point 
which the FI opens the financial account for the entity. (s. VI, Para. A, ss. 1(a))  
 For the purposes of determining the aggregate balance of the financial account and 
related currency conversions if necessary the same aggregation rules that apply to 
individual accounts are applicable to entity held accounts. 
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The reasonableness test referred to under the due diligence procedures for individual accounts 
will also need to be applied on the self-certification forms received from both pre-existing as 
well as their controlling persons. (s. VI, Para. A, ss. 1(b)) 
The review of all new entity accounts must be completed by 28th February 2017 whilst pre-
existing entity accounts must be completed by 28th February 2018. 
A Change in circumstance 
The Standard also requires that a FI must ensure an adequate process is in place to identify if 
and when the tax residency of either the individual or entity account holder or its related 
controlling persons could change subsequent to the on-boarding of the financial account. 
Should there be a change in circumstance the FI will be required to re-consider the status of 
the financial account by re-applying due-diligence procedures applicable to that account type. 
(s. IX, Para. A, ss.1) 
Examples of a change in circumstance of an account holder and its related controlling persons 
include but are not limited to the following: 
 An individual account holder who was previously not tax resident in a reportable 
jurisdiction/s subsequently becomes a tax resident in a reportable jurisdiction/s making 
the financial account and the account holder reportable under the CRS 
 An individual account holder who was previously tax resident in reportable jurisdiction/s 
and therefore reportable under the CRS, subsequently ceases to be tax resident in any 
reportable jurisdiction/s making the financial account and account holder not-reportable 
 An individual account whose aggregate account balance either increases/decreases 
above/below the R 15,000,000 threshold for the classification of a high value/low value 
accounts resulting in a change in due diligence procedures that need to be applied to that 
financial account 
 An entity account that previously had no controlling persons as a reportable person 
subsequently acquires at least one controlling person who is a reportable person making 
the entity financial account and the controlling person reportable under the CRS 
 An entity that previously had one or more controlling person/s that were reportable 
persons and whose status has now changed to a non-reportable person/s resulting in 
neither the entity financial account nor the controlling person being reportable under the 
CRS 
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 An entity who was not previously classified as a passive NFE now meets the criteria making 
it a passive NFE and vice versa 
In the event there is a change in circumstance that causes the FI to know or have reason to 
know that the original documentary evidence (or other equivalent documentation) is incorrect 
or unreliable then, by the later of the last day of the relevant reporting period (February), or 90 
calendar days following the notice or discovery of such change in circumstances, obtain a new 
self-certification and new evidence to establish the correct residence(s) for tax purposes of the 
Account Holder and/or the controlling persons. (s. IX, Para. A, ss. 2) 
How to determine if an entity account is reportable under the CRS:   
Based on the explanation of the rules above the following example illustrates how to 
determine if an entity account holder may become reportable under the CRS.  
Trust A is a South African trust with no foreign indicia. Controlling persons A1 has no foreign 
indicia whilst A2 was identified as having foreign indicia. The resultant scenario is that Trust A 
(despite having no foreign indicia) will be reportable under the CRS. 
Trust B is a South African trust with no foreign indicia. Controlling persons B1 has Australian 
indicia whilst B2 was identified as having indicia of Great Britain. The resultant scenario is that 
Trust B (despite having no foreign indicia) and controlling person B1 and B2 will be reportable 
under CRS. 
Trust C is a South African trust with no foreign indicia. Controlling persons C1 and C2 have no 
foreign indicia. The resultant scenario is that neither Trust C nor its controlling persons will be 
reportable under the CRS. 
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Figure 1.1 
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Chapter Three: A suggested solution for implementing the Standard into a FI 
Now that the relevant sections of the Standard have been explained it will be necessary to 
determine the most efficient way to implement these requirements into the day to day 
operations of a FI. In designing these procedures all relevant stakeholders in the process 
should be consulted to ensure that the process achieves the desired outcome and more 
importantly is understood by those that it impacts the most which in the case of a FI is usually 
the staff members who directly interact with customers. The format and design of the tax 
residency self-certification forms, related customer communications and additional points for 
a FI to consider will be discussed in chapter four.  
 
Some context is first required into the type of FI that is being used as a case study for this 
report. The FI concerned is a division within one of the largest banks in South Africa and its 
core activities include the following: asset management services for individuals, trust and 
estate administration, will drafting and custody, reporting of the bank accounts of all 
customers in the broader FI who are deceased to the appropriate executors of the estates and 
the providing of fiduciary advice. 
 
No financial accounts are opened in the areas of will drafting, the providing of fiduciary advice 
and reporting of financial accounts of the deceased hence the Standard is not applicable to 
these. In the case of estate administration, upon receipt of the death certificate or will of the 
deceased, all bank accounts of the deceased are closed and any new financial accounts are 
opened in the name of the Estate late. This falls in line with the definition of an excluded 
account as contained in the Standard and as a result no further action is required on these 
account types. 
 
The requirements of the Standard are applicable to the trust administration and asset 
management services for individual’s rendered by the FI. These functions involve the opening 
of financial accounts to receive income from assets such as fixed properties and investments 
held by the Trust entities/individuals as well as to pay these proceeds out to 
beneficiaries/account holders and settle other expenses. As South Africa is a participating 
jurisdiction to the Standard, the FI becomes a reporting financial institution. None of the Trusts 
managed by the FI are FIs themselves, meaning the rules around the reporting requirements 
for Trust deed documented Trusts do not apply and therefore all Trust entities and their 
27 
 
controlling persons will be reported by the FI. It should also be noted that none of the Trust 
account types in the FI are excluded accounts as defined. 
 
In designing both the processes relating to the on-boarding of new account holders as well as 
the remediation of pre-existing accounts below it should be noted that the FI elected to 
perform the same due-diligence procedures across all entity accounts and hence did not 
choose the option to exclude entity accounts with an aggregate account balance of less than $ 
250,000 as discussed in chapter one. 
 
The due diligence requirements for both the individual and entity financial accounts have been 
streamlined into a single process thus significantly simplifying its implementation into the day 
to day business operations.   
 
Process for the on-boarding of new individual and entity account holders and their 
controlling persons 
 
New account holder is being on-boarded: 
At the point of on-boarding a prospective account holder it must first be determined: 
 If the customer is an individual account holder 
 If the customer is forming a new trust or   
 The trust is already in existence and the FI has assumed the role of trustee/trust 
Administration or fiduciary advisor 
 In addition if the new-to-bank account holder is a trust entity then the controlling 
persons of that Trust must also be identified and categorised into either natural or 
juristic persons. 
For the trust: 
 The entity tax residency self-certification form will need to be completed by the 
authorised representative of the Trust. This can include any natural persons granted 
authority to act on behalf of the Trust as contained in the Trust deed or by virtue of 
being granted a power of attorney. 
 In the event that the FI is the sole trustee on the trust the entity self-certification form 
will not be required. (See chapter four under matters not covered by the Standard). 
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 If the FI is not the sole trustee or is a co-trustee then all authorised signatories will be 
required to complete the entity tax residency self-certification form including any FI staff 
members who have been granted the authority to do so. 
Individual account holders and controlling persons who are natural persons: 
 The natural person tax residency self-certification form will need to be completed for 
each person identified in this category.  
 If the FI is also identified as a controlling person e.g. a corporate trustee on a trust, then 
the staff member of that FI who has been named as a trustee on behalf of the FI will also 
be required to complete the form. These staff members must include their personal 
details e.g. demographic data, tax reference numbers on the self-certification forms. The 
information of the FI cannot be used. 
 In the event that the account holder or controlling person is unable to complete the form 
due to incapacity such as by virtue of being a minor then a power of attorney or 
parent/guardian will need to complete and sign the form on their behalf. 
Controlling persons who are juristic persons: 
 In the event that a controlling person is a juristic person, then the entity tax-residency 
self-certification form should be completed by that entity which is a controlling person. 
High value individual account holders:  
 If any individual account holders have an account balance in excess of R 15,000,000 then 
it will be necessary for the FI to complete a client liaison officer declaration.  
 This declaration is NOT to be completed by customers but rather by the relevant FI RM. 
Reasonability test on self-certification forms received (this step is highlighted in red in the 
figure 1.3 and 1.4 below to emphasise importance of this test being carried out):  
 Once the account holder/controlling person/s have provided the required tax residency 
self-certification forms a reasonability test will need to be conducted on the information 
contained in the form.  
 A quality assurance check should also be carried out to confirm that all required fields on 
the self-certification forms are complete and declarations signed by the correct persons. 
 If the FI can find no evidence that may prove the information supplied by the account 
holder/controlling person is incorrect then the self-certification has passed the 
reasonability test. 
 If the FI suspects that there may be evidence which prevents reliance on the 
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information contained in the self-certification form: 
o The account holder/controlling person should be requested to re-confirm that 
the information provided on the self-certification form is correct. 
o If the FI believes that the self-certification is still incorrect then a new self-
certification form may be requested from the account holder/controlling person. 
 Evidence that these checks were carried out must be retained for audit verification 
purposes.  
Account holder/controlling person does not co-operate in providing the self-certification 
forms:  
 If the account holder/controlling person refuse to provide the required self-certification 
forms they will be reported as undocumented and recalcitrant.  
Checking for indicia (Types of indicia are discussed in Chapter 2) 
 The entity self-certification forms must be inspected for entity specific indicia. 
 The natural person self-certification forms must be inspected for individual specific 
indicia. 
No Indicia found 
 If no indicia are found on the trust, individual account holders or controlling persons of 
the trust then these accounts will not be reportable under the CRS. 
Indicia found 
 If indicia are found on the trust, individual account holders or controlling persons of 
trusts then these accounts will be reportable under the CRS. 
Capturing information received on front end system of FI and storage of forms: 
 The relevant information from the self-certification forms must then be captured by the 
FI front end system and the forms stored in hardcopy on the client file and electronically 
on an appropriate document storage system. 
Change in client circumstance: 
 Should the circumstance of the account holder and/or controlling person change it will 
be necessary for the FI to re-visit the procedures above to consider if the indicia that 
were previously identified or not are still applicable and then determine the appropriate 
process to follow. 
 A new tax residency self-certification form should be requested if there is a change in 
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circumstance. 
 The FI front end system should then be updated to reflect the relevant changes 
accordingly. 
 
Table 1.1 
 
Process for the remediation of pre-existing account holders and controlling persons 
The remediation of the pre-existing account base will principally follow the same process as set 
out above. The key distinction between the two processes, however, will firstly be the need for 
the FI using their respective business intelligence function to categorise the client data into the 
respective account categories and secondly to conduct an impact analysis using an electronic 
search to identify those financial accounts which have any indicia in a foreign jurisdiction. This 
will be necessary as these financial accounts have already been on-boarded by the FI and these 
determinations will have to be made retrospectively. 
 
Issuing of tax residency self-certification forms to account holders and controlling persons: 
 The issuing of the relevant tax residency self-certification forms will follow the same rules 
as set out above. 
 A communiqué to the customer should also accompany the self-certification form which 
sets out why these forms are required and the obligations of the account holder to 
comply with the request. 
Monitoring of responses: 
One of three scenarios will subsequently occur: 
 The request is fulfilled and the self-certification forms are returned by the account 
holders/controlling person/s. 
 The request is not acknowledged as having being received by the account 
holders/controlling person/s. 
 The account holders/controlling person/s refuse to comply with the request to provide 
the information. 
The request is fulfilled and the self-certification forms returned: 
 The reasonability test will then need to be applied. 
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The request is not acknowledged as having being received: 
If no response is received after the first communication:  
 A second communication should be sent 7 days after the first communication. 
If no response is received after the second communication a third and final 
communication must be sent out: 
 A third communication should be sent 7 days after the second communication. 
If the self-certification forms are received after these subsequent communications then 
the reasonability test should be applied accordingly. 
Account holder and/or controlling person/s refuse to comply with the request to provide 
self-certification forms: 
If no feedback is received or the account holder does not wish to co-operate in providing the 
relevant information then an appropriate classification as per the SARS Business 
Requirements Specification should be recorded against the profile of the financial account. 
 Account holder contacted but no response received. 
 Account holder did not co-operate in providing data. 
 Unable to contact account holder due to reasonable efforts. 
 Account holder still to be contacted due to timing of identification (SARS: 2016) 
Recording of customer communication: 
 All communications sent out and received during this process should be recorded by the 
FI.  
 The dates and method/s of communication should also be recorded.  
 This will serve as evidence that the customer has been contacted. 
 
Table 1.2 
 
After the procedures listed above have completed the FI will then need to collate the 
demographic and financial account information for all reportable accounts and controlling 
persons into a SARS prescribed reporting format and submit the file to SARS. Prior to the final 
file submission the FI will need to be subjected to additional testing for accuracy, file layout 
and other validations.  
 
Most, if not all FIs will also require the procedures above to be to be mapped out in a process 
view as well as to identify and rate associated risks and suggest control mechanisms to 
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mitigate these risks. This exercise also stems from the South African Reserve Bank’s 
requirements for all banks to ensure its high risk areas are identified and risks mitigated to 
ensure capital adequacy planning is in place in accordance with Basel reporting requirements. 
For the purposes of risk rating, inherent risk is defined as the probability of loss arising out of 
circumstances or existing in an environment, in the absence of any action to control or modify 
the circumstances (Business Dictionary, n.d.).  Residual risk is defined as exposure to loss 
remaining after other known risks have been countered, factored in, or eliminated (Business 
Dictionary, n.d.).  The key processes, risks and controls are illustrated below. 
 
 
High Level overview of critical timelines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
 
2016 
 
2017 
 
2018 
1st March 2016: Roll out of tax 
residency self-certification forms 
and the commencement of the 
remediation of pre-existing 
individual and entity financial 
accounts and controlling persons. 
 
First AEOI report due 
to SARS on 31st May 
2017 
Second AEOI report 
due to SARS on the 
31st of May 2018 
Completion of the remediation 
of pre-existing high value 
financial accounts and entity and 
individual accounts on boarded 
on/after 1 March 2016 
Completion of the 
balance of the individual 
and entity accounts on 1 
March 2018 
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Figure 1.3 Due diligence procedures for the on-boarding of new
 financial accounts 
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Figure 1.4 Due diligence procedures for pre-existing financial accounts
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Key Processes , Risks and Controls 
N
o. 
Process 
Risk 
Inherent 
Risk 
Rating 
Control m
easure 
Residual 
Risk 
Rating 
Responsible 
functional area in the 
FI 
1. 
Categorising account type 
and controlling persons. 
Staff 
of 
a 
FI 
m
ay 
incorrectly 
and/or not identify all relevant 
parties to an account.  
M
edium
 
A 
detailed 
procedure 
guideline 
should be developed and rolled out 
to all im
pacted staff as part of a 
form
alised training program
m
e to 
create 
aw
areness 
of 
CRS 
requirem
ents. 
Low
 
RM
s 
2. 
Issuing of Self-certification 
form
s. 
The 
incorrect 
self-certification 
form
s m
ay be issued for the 
incorrect account type/ or not 
issued at all. 
M
edium
 
A m
onthly exception report should 
be generated from
 the FI front end 
system
 and actively m
onitored to 
identify 
m
issing 
inform
ation 
on 
account 
profiles. 
Any 
apparent 
errors w
ill be identified during the 
quality assurance process. 
Low
 
This should be done at 
a supervisory level by 
an independent 
com
pliance function 
w
ithin the FI.  
3. 
Reasonability Test. 
The reasonability Test m
ay be 
incorrectly 
applied 
or 
not 
applied at all. 
High 
A sam
ple of form
s received should 
be checked against the client file 
for 
evidence 
that 
all 
available 
inform
ation has been considered in 
applying the test.  
Low
 
This should be done at 
a supervisory level by 
an independent 
com
pliance function 
w
ithin the FI. 
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 4. 
Com
pletion 
of 
the 
CLO
 
declaration. 
The staff m
em
ber of the FI m
ay 
not 
com
plete 
the 
CLO
 
declaration 
as 
they 
have 
incorrectly 
applied 
the 
aggregation rules in determ
ining 
if an account is classified as a 
high value account. 
M
edium
 
A m
onthly exception report of all 
high 
value 
accounts 
should 
be 
generated from
 the FI front end 
system
 and actively m
onitored and 
follow
ed up w
ith staff to ensure 
that 
all 
declarations 
for 
the 
identified 
accounts 
have 
been 
com
pleted. 
 
Low
 
This should be done at 
a supervisory level by 
an independent 
com
pliance function 
w
ithin the FI and then 
com
m
unicated to 
affected staff to 
com
plete. 
5. 
Checking for indicia 
Incorrect indicia checks m
ay be 
applied and this could result in 
the 
account 
being 
incorrectly 
reported 
to 
SARS 
or 
not 
reported at all. 
High 
Errors in the indicia process w
ill be 
identified 
during 
the 
Q
uality 
Assurance process. 
Low
 
This should be done at 
a supervisory level by 
an independent 
com
pliance function 
w
ithin the FI. 
6. 
Change in circum
stance 
U
ndue reliance m
ay be placed 
on the account holder or 
controlling person inform
ing the 
FI of a change in circum
stance 
resulting in the FI not taking 
appropriate actions in changing 
the reporting status of the 
account and controlling persons. 
High 
The FI should institute an annual 
review
 
process 
to 
pro-actively 
identify in instances of a change in 
circum
stance.  
Low
 
RM
s 
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 7. 
Classification 
of 
account 
on front end system
. 
FI staff m
ay in error capture the 
status 
of 
the 
account 
thus 
leading to incorrect reporting of 
the account to SARS. 
M
edium
 
A sam
ple of form
s received should 
be checked against the system
 as 
evidence 
that 
all 
available 
inform
ation 
has 
been 
captured 
correctly. 
Low
 
This should be done at 
a supervisory level by 
an independent 
com
pliance function 
w
ithin the FI. 
8. 
Reporting to SARS. 
The 
quality 
of 
financial 
and 
dem
ographic 
inform
ation 
reported 
to 
SARS 
m
ay 
be 
inferior or incorrect and not in 
line w
ith SARS requirem
ents. 
High 
The 
report 
to 
SARS 
should 
be 
appropriately 
tested 
and 
all 
financial 
and 
dem
ographic 
data 
tested to ensure accuracy. 
Low
 
This should be done at 
a supervisory level by 
an independent 
com
pliance function 
w
ithin the FI together 
w
ith the business 
intelligence team
 w
ho 
creates the file. 
10. 
Rem
ediation  
The data set to be extracted for 
the 
purposes 
of 
rem
ediation 
m
ay not adequately identify all 
im
pacted custom
ers and/or m
ay 
not contain all fields necessary 
for the identification of indicia. 
High 
A data requirem
ents specifications 
should be drafted to ensure all 
required inform
ation is available. 
The 
data 
extract 
should 
be 
validated using a sanity test  
Low
 
 
Table 1.
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Chapter Four: Additional requirements and other practical considerations of CRS implementation  
 
Whilst the processes described in the previous chapter appears fairly straightforward, there are 
numerous other requirements that need to be considered and addressed to ensure a successful 
implementation of the Standard. These additional requirements which will be discussed below 
present its own unique set of challenges to the FI. These will vary between FI and are dependent on 
the account types within a specific FI. A few of the more significant aspects faced by the FI 
considered in this paper will be discussed in this chapter and suggestions made as to how to 
overcome them. 
 
Design of the self-certification forms 
As discussed briefly in chapter one the Standard requires that a FI update their on-boarding process 
to include the relevant tax residency self-certification forms for all new financial accounts opened. 
This form will allow the prospective account holder to supply their relevant tax residency 
information and also allow the FI to determine the classification of the account holder for CRS 
reporting purposes at the point of on-boarding. This is the first step in ensuring that a FI is compliant 
with the requirements of the Standard as it will prevent the need for the FI to have to 
retrospectively collect the information from the account holders.  
 
In order to successfully gather the information required to decide whether or not the financial 
account and respective account holders/controlling persons are reportable under CRS, it is 
imperative that the FI design these forms in a manner which is both efficient for the relevant parties 
to complete as well as ensuring that it caters for all the required information to be collected. The 
OECD has provided guidelines around the minimum requirements that are to be considered by FI 
when designing both the entity and individual self-certification forms. These guidelines, however, 
are very basic and a South African FI cannot rely solely on these as the Tax authority in each 
participating jurisdiction will have their own set of requirements in addition to those specified by the 
OECD.  
 
In a South African context a more appropriate starting point will be for the FI to investigate and 
unpack the reporting obligations contained in the South African Revenue Service, Business 
Requirements Specifications for the Automatic Exchange of Information. Each reporting FI in South 
Africa will ultimately have to comply with these requirements when the reporting of the account 
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information of reportable accounts and persons occurs. The table below has been adapted from the 
SARS BRS and illustrates the information that will need to be reported to SARS if a financial account 
and its related parties are found to be reportable under the CRS. This provides an appropriate 
guideline as to the type of information that will need to be collected through the use of the self-
certification forms. Additional considerations have also been noted.
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  Fields to be reported as per SARS  
BRS (SARS, 2016) 
Applicability 
to the 
natural 
person self-
certification 
Applicability 
to the juristic 
person self-
certification 
Additional G
uidance 
N
ature of person  
D
 
D
 
The various types of juristics persons m
ust be catered for in this section. E.g. Com
pany, 
Close Corporation, Trust etc. 
Surnam
e 
D
 
n/a 
 
Registered nam
e of entity 
n/a 
D
 
 
Initials  
D
 
n/a 
 
First N
am
es 
D
 
n/a 
 
Date of Birth /Incorporation date 
for entity 
 
  D 
D
 
  
 Country of Birth /Place of 
Incorporation 
 D 
D
 
 The place of effective m
anagem
ent of an entity should also be requested as this w
ill 
also assist in determ
ining tax residency. 
Postal address sam
e as physical 
address indicator  
D
 
D
 
A tick box w
ith Yes/N
o w
ould suffice here. 
Physical address care of indicator  
D
 
D
 
A tick box w
ith Yes/N
o w
ould suffice here. 
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 Physical address 
D
 
D
 
This should include details such as the unit num
ber, nam
e of com
plex, street num
ber 
and nam
e, suburb, city and tow
n. 
Physical address postal code 
D
 
D
 
 
Physical address country  
D
 
D
 
 
Postal address care off indicator  
D
 
D
 
A tick box w
ith Yes/N
o w
ould suffice here. 
Postal address  
D
 
D
 
 
Postal code 
D
 
D
 
 
Postal address country  
D
 
D
 
 
Identification/Registration 
N
um
ber 
D
 
D
 
This refers to an identity docum
ent, passport or other accepted m
eans of identification 
or in the case of a juristic person the com
pany/Trust registration num
ber w
ould apply 
here. 
Identification Type 
D
 
n/a 
Passport, Identity docum
ent or other accepted m
eans of identification. 
Tax identification num
ber 
D
 
D
 
The form
 should cater for m
ore than one tax identification num
ber as the account 
holder m
ay be registered in m
ore than one tax jurisdiction for tax purposes. 
Account Holder Type 
D
 
D
 
This can be achieved by including on the form
 the different types of account 
classifications specified by the Standard and requesting the person com
pleting the form
 
to confirm
 w
hich classification their account w
ill fall into.  
 
Table 1.4
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The OECD (2016: 6) also prescribes that the following declaration is also included on all self-
certification forms and signed by either the account holder or the controlling persons and authorised 
signatories completing the forms on behalf of the juristic person.   
 
 I declare that all statements made in this declaration are, to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
correct and complete. I undertake to advise [the Financial Institution/insert FI’s name] within [XX] 
days of any change in circumstances which affects the tax residency status of the individual identified 
in this form or causes the information contained herein to become incorrect or incomplete, and to 
provide [the Financial Institution that maintains the account/FI’s name] with a suitably updated self-
certification and Declaration within [up to XX] days of such change in circumstances.  
 
It will also be necessary for the FI to include the relevant data protection and privacy clauses on the 
self-certification forms. This will safeguard the FI in the event that there may be a misuse of account 
holder’s information. There is no guarantee that the tax jurisdictions to which the information is 
reported will be used purely for its intended purpose and a FI will need to protect itself against this 
(this concept is discussed further in chapter five). 
 
Incorporating FATCA and CRS into a single operational process 
Whilst this paper does not cover the requirements of FATCA in detail, it is worth mentioning that the 
FI should align as far as practically possible the requirements of both the CRS and FATCA.  In 
principle they both require the collection of the same account holder information, so scope does 
exist for a single due diligence process. In addition it will also be worthwhile adding into the tax 
residency self-certifications instructions for any account holders or controlling persons who are 
considered U.S persons (i.e. any entity or controlling persons who have indicia of the United States 
of America on their profile). These U.S persons should be reminded that in addition to providing the 
self-certification form they will also need to provide the FI with the appropriate Internal Revenue 
Service forms. FIs should also be cautious when determining the account classification for FATCA 
purposes as in some cases these classifications differ from those defined in the CRS. 
 
Remediation of pre-existing accounts 
The Standard also requires an entity to also obtain the tax information of all pre-existing accounts 
and their controlling persons. This is perhaps the biggest challenge faced by a FI as it requires that all 
accounts held by the FI prior to 1 March 2016 be identified and inspected for Indicia. There are 
numerous factors to consider in ensuring the successful completion of this exercise. The two key 
elements that will be discussed though relate to the ability of a FI to identify impacted accounts and 
to ensure adequate staffing is in place to handle the remediation exercise. 
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 Data requirements  
A data requirements specification will need to be drafted and supplied to the business 
intelligence teams within the FI to ensure the correct data set is extracted. This requirement 
should contain all the relevant fields required to categorise the account holders, controlling 
persons and apply indicia checks as set out in the due diligence rules in Figure 1.3 above.  It is 
also important to ensure that the data is in some way validated and tested for accuracy before 
reliance can be placed on it for the use in the remediation exercise. 
 
 Contacting of pre-existing account holders and controlling persons 
As this exercise is happening post on-boarding of an account each account holder and 
controlling person identified in this data set will need to be contacted individually and requested 
to complete the tax residency self-certification form that is applicable to them. Depending on 
the number of pre-existing accounts identified in the data set the FI may have to set up a 
dedicated team just to conduct this exercise within the prescribed timelines. Another option will 
be to leverage into any other areas of the FI which are conducting an exercise of a similar nature. 
This is a viable option especially in the case of larger FI which usually have call centre like 
environments and are accustomed to conducting exercises of a similar nature. 
 
Impact on staff of the FI 
Staff of a FI is perhaps the most pivotal stakeholders in implementing the Standard as they are the 
ones responsible for ensuring the due-diligence procedures are carried out effectively and in line 
with the Standard. The challenge for the FI is therefore to ensure that all impacted staff is trained 
and having a working knowledge of the Standard as a significant amount of reliance is placed on 
them. Failing to do this will result in the FI being exposed to a significant amount of risk due to non-
compliance.  
 
For instance the Standard explicitly places ultimate responsibility on the FI in ensuring that the 
information supplied by the account holders and controlling person are correct through the 
application of the reasonability tests and CLO declarations. No amount of disclaimers on the self-
certification forms can absolve the FI of this responsibility. Whilst it is acknowledged that safeguards 
like these are necessary, the fact remains that if an account holder wishes to hide their tax residency 
status they will certainly try. In addition, staff of a FI is not trained in the art of forensic analysis and 
investigation and will ultimately rely on a gut feel of sorts. In most cases any doubt about the 
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information supplied on the self-certification forms may only be prompted due to a slip of tongue of 
the tax dodging customer or as a result of adverse media reports about them.  
 
Embedding this sort of skill set into staff is challenging to say the least. To this point it is suggested 
that a formal training module be developed and rolled out to all impacted staff to ensure that their 
knowledge of Standard is at the required level. Face to face training sessions should also be 
conducted which should include scenario analysis of the different methods customers could use to 
conceal tax residency related information and methods and probing questions that could be asked 
which could bring hidden facts to the surface. Staff should also be encouraged to escalate any 
matters that may be unsure of to the relevant subject matter expert within the FI for further clarity 
or guidance. To ensure that these training modules are effective, a set of assessment questions 
should be created and staff should be expected to successfully complete this. Most FIs have formal 
online learning tools so this assessment can easily be incorporated and completion rates of staff 
tracked. This will also assist staff in clearly articulating the requirements of the Standard to any 
prospective and pre-existing customers.  
 
Impact on customers 
A FI will also need to manage the expectations of their customers from whom this information is 
being requested. Information cannot simply be requested without adequate reasons as to why. In 
fact given the complexity of the account classifications as per the Standard it will be necessary for 
some form of guidance to be given to the customer before the FI can expect them to complete the 
self-certification forms. The simplest method to achieve this would be designing a fact sheet 
containing a high level overview of the CRS and the obligations it places on FIs to collect tax 
information of account holders and controlling persons. In addition a glossary of the key terms that 
could assist a customer in determining their account status should also be supplied. A word of 
caution though, a FI must ensure that no form of tax advice is being given in either any of the 
documentation or through conversations with the customer as this creates financial and 
reputational risk for the FI should the advice be incorrect. Customers should be encouraged to 
consult tax advisors in their tax jurisdictions to assist them in making a more informed decision. As a 
matter of courtesy and managing relationships it also advised that should a customer fail to comply 
with the request to provide the information they should be notified that the FI has no other option 
but to report them to SARS as recalcitrant and that they may be subject to fines and penalties as 
determined by SARS. 
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System development and the design of the report to SARS 
System development and reporting to SARS are two of the more technical aspects that need to be in 
place in FIs in ensuring compliance. The starting point for both these requirements should be the 
SARS BRS for AEOI as this will provide a clear indication of the type of information that SARS 
requires. Once the FI has a view on all required fields, a gap analysis should be undertaken to 
identify which reporting fields are already available on their front end system (i.e. the system which 
is used by the FI to capture all customer information) versus those that aren’t and that still require 
some form of IT development.  This will avoid the duplication of fields that already exist and 
minimise the cost of development for new fields especially where the FI is reliant on a service 
provider to perform this task. Whilst the ideal situation would be for all relevant CRS fields to be 
available on a front end system, the FI should also seriously consider the cost of building these 
additional fields especially when they have a small number of account holders that are impacted by 
the Standard. If this is the case, maintaining a manual register of sorts to capture the information 
would suffice and save on significant development costs. A similar exercise can be undertaken when 
designing and building the report to SARS. In this case, however, the FI can leverage of the design 
and build of existing third party reporting to SARS such as FATCA and IT3 reporting (which is a 
summary of any income such as interest and dividends that have been paid by a FI into a customer’s 
financial account held with that FI). It is imperative that a FI institute a formal process of testing and 
validating the account information on the file before it is submitted to SARS. This would help 
mitigate the likelihood of errors on the file and improve overall data quality.  
 
Quality assurance and monitoring 
A key governance requirement in most FIs would relate to a quality assurance and monitoring 
function to be instituted over all CRS related procedures. This would serve as an ideal opportunity 
for the FI to ensure that staff are carrying out due diligence procedures as well as capturing 
information from the self-certifications on the front end system of the FI correctly and if necessary 
take remedial action where trends in errors are identified. A simple yet effective manner of 
instituting these additional controls would be through a combined use of exception reports, 
information contained in client files and sample checks of the tax residency self-certification forms. 
The exception reports can be used to identify amongst other aspects, accounts that have breached 
the high value accounts threshold as well fields on the front end system that have been captured 
incorrectly or not captured at all. The sample checks on the client files will highlight whether the 
self-certification forms are being completed as requested and can also be used to assess whether 
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the reasonability test is being applied correctly. This function should ideally be conducted by an 
independent functional area in the FI. e.g. compliance manager. 
 
Retention of evidence 
The FI will also need to ensure that evidence of all communication between themselves and the 
customer as well as the self-certification forms are retained and stored in an appropriate document 
management system. This is necessary in the event that an internal party e.g. the internal audit 
function or an external party like SARS request the documentation for audit verification purposes. 
This is the only proof the FI will have to show the relevant requesting parties that they have carried 
out and complied with the due diligence procedures. These documents should be retained for a 
period of 5 years as per the requirements of the Tax Administration Act, 2011 (Act No. 28 of 2011).  
 
Safeguarding of customer data and privacy controls 
This aspect is now more significant than ever especially considering the requirements of the 
Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI). This piece of legislation ensures that all South African 
Financial institutions conduct themselves in a responsible manner when collecting, processing, 
storing and sharing another person’s personal information by holding them accountable should they 
abuse or compromise that personal information in any way. (Workpool, n.d.) 
 
Data protection is not simply about the confidentiality of the data being gathered and exchanged. 
That the information will be kept confidential, and that there will be no unauthorised disclosure of 
information, is simply the starting point. Foreign tax authorities that have inadequate provisions for 
guaranteeing the confidentiality of data, and which are prone to leaks, are clearly providing 
inadequate data protection and cannot possibly receive data whilst these inadequate safeguards 
exist. However, confidentiality is only the starting point; data protection law gives the data subject 
much more extensive rights. Data may only be gathered and exchanged for a lawful purpose which 
must be clearly identified in sufficiently specified terms that any misuse of the data can be 
challenged, and must not be retained longer than is necessary for the identified purpose. The data 
subject has the right to be notified and to have access to the data and the right to correct any 
inaccuracies. Legal remedies need to exist to protect the rights of the data subject, and 
compensation has to be paid for improper processing of data. (Baker, 2016: 6) 
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FIs will therefore need to ensure that adequate controls are in place to ensure that data collected for 
CRS is protected as required by POPI. In addition should an FI make use of service providers to 
collect this information the relevant POPI clauses should be included in all service level agreements 
with that service provider. 
 
Matters not covered in the Standard 
The Standard has been written in very much a one approach fits all manner. The FI in the case study 
has found that there are a few practical considerations that need to be addressed before full 
application of the Standard is achieved. No guidance exists on these matters either in the Standard 
or through the application of any industry best practices. As a result the FI had to determine its own 
best practice solution through extensive consultation with other subject matter experts within the 
larger group FI.  
 
If the FI serves as the sole Trustee on the Trust account, then completing the entity self-certification 
would not be necessary as, this would amount to the FI attesting to itself. Trust entities in which a FI 
is the sole Trustee would in most cases be defaulted to a Passive NFE for CRS account classification 
purposes.  
 
Another consideration is whether or not account holders and controlling persons of financial 
accounts that have terminated their relationships with the FI during the reporting period should be 
contacted as part of the remediation exercise. The Standard does require reporting of financial 
accounts with indicia despite the accounts being closed before the end of February 2016. To this 
extent the decision was taken by the FI that only account holders and controlling persons with 
terminated financial accounts that have any foreign Indicia will be contacted as part of the 
remediation exercise as these may need to be reported. Any other terminated accounts will be 
excluded from this exercise completely. 
 
The Standard also does not specify the number of times an account holder and the controlling 
persons must be contacted as part of the remediation exercise. This determination is left at the 
discretion of the FI. In other words a FI may choose to contact the account holder once or multiple 
times in an attempt to obtain the self-certification forms. In deciding the number of times to contact 
the account holder a fine balance between maintaining positive relations with a customer and the 
need to meet the SARS deadline must be achieved. Should a FI decide to go with a single contact 
approach and no response is received from the account holder and/or controlling person then the FI 
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runs the risk of reporting the account to SARS when in fact it may not be reportable, furthermore if it 
is reported that the account holder is recalcitrant, SARS will incorrectly levy administrative penalties 
on that financial account. Errors like this cannot bode well for the reputation of the FI. An alternative 
approach will be to align the requests with other compliance related remediation projects being run 
in the FI. In the FI discussed in this paper, it was decided to align the three contact strategy for CRS 
to the process currently being used for the KYC remediation programme being run within the FI. This 
multiple contact strategy provides the account holders and controlling persons an ample amount of 
time to submit the required information thereby significantly reducing the risk of incorrect reporting 
by the FI. 
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Chapter Five: Costs considerations of CRS implementation in a FI 
 
The cost of CRS compliance will come in many direct and indirect forms such as the cost to:  
 Monitor the global implementation of CRS and keep up-to-date with local laws jurisdictions  
 Keep policy and requirements up-to-date  
 Conduct remediation and reviews for all in-scope financial accounts on a regular basis  
 Conduct remediation and reviews for all accounts that come into scope for new countries 
entering into agreements  
 Collate, collect, validate and store data and documentation to evidence compliance. (Fenergo, 
2016: 22) 
 
Like with the any other project it will be necessary for the FI to prepare a budget and track the actual 
costs incurred against the budgeted costs.  This will help the FI in identifying any significant 
deviations from the budget and enable corrective action to be taken immediately thereby 
preventing project costs from spiralling out of control. Given that this is a new piece of legislation 
the FI may experience some difficulty in allocating appropriate budgeted hours to the project. Care 
must be taken to ensure that any allocations are reasonable thereby avoiding over or under 
budgeting for the implementation. The table below illustrates the budgeted and actual costs 
incurred by the FI used in the case study. It also includes a variance analysis of budgeted vs actual 
time spent on each activity. A costing model similar to activity based costing was undertaken and an 
average cost per resource allocated. This cost represents the average cost of all staff within the FI 
and is used for all budgeting purposes within the FI. It should also be noted that the costs reflected 
below exclude the opportunity cost of implementation and therefore any potential revenue that 
could be generated through the different allocation of resources are not considered. There is 
potential however for a FI to manage and minimise the costs of a few of the activities described 
below. The costs arrived at below may not apply equally to all FIs, however they are presented 
purely to serve as a guideline of how a costing excercise could be potentially undertaken. 
 
Learnings from FATCA implementation 
The fact that the Standard draws extensively on FATCA and on existing FATF standards should 
significantly reduce the costs of implementation. Furthermore the main burden relating to due 
diligence and reporting obligations falls on financial institutions rather than governments with many 
financial institutions already familiar with these obligations both through FATCA and their exposure 
to the Standard in other implementing jurisdictions where they have operations. (OECD, n.d. (b)) 
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Using an external party to assist with compliance 
Some FIs may opt to use an external service provider to assist with compliance. The benefit of this is 
that the FI will save significant expenditure associated with system development costs, staff costs of 
personnel with the appropriate level of technical tax knowledge and other skilled project resources. 
Another area where the FI can benefit is the time saved by staff during the remediation of pre- 
existing financial accounts which involves contacting account holders and controlling persons to 
complete the tax residency self-certification forms.  This is usually viewed as an administratively 
intensive exercise which most FIs would likely want to avoid at all costs. Consideration must also be 
given to whether or not the service provider is capable of fulfilling the objective of the Standard. This 
can only be done after the necessary due diligence procedures are conducted on any potential 
service providers to determine their ability to deliver data that is both timeous and at the required 
level of quality as well as the overall fee that will be charged for an exercise of this nature. In the FI 
used in this case study past experience in dealing with an external service providers suggests that 
despite outsourcing, staff of the FI inevitably end up just as involved with the more complex aspects 
whether this exercise is outsourced or not.  
Another point that may argue against the use of a service provider has to deal with the due diligence 
procedures discussed in two. For instance in applying the reasonability test which is a key step in the 
process, a service provider will simply not have the same level of knowledge of the account holder 
that the staff of the FI will possess resulting in the incorrect application of these rules.  
Finally, it should be noted that the ultimate responsibility for implementing due diligence 
procedures and thus the risk of non-compliance lies with the FI, this aspect can unfortunately not be 
outsourced. The suggestion therefore to any FIs intending to make use of service providers for this 
exercise will be to possibly make use of certain aspects of their services particularly in the areas of 
system design and development and the interpretation of the legislation and design of processes 
whilst all other aspects should ideally remain within the FI. 
 
Collaborating with other areas within the larger group FI 
A collaborative effort will be an option for a FI within a larger group structure. Greater economies of 
scale can be achieved in this scenario particularly within the areas of information sharing and peer 
review. It will be possible for subject matter experts within the different business units in the FI to 
create a CRS working group and discuss and debate areas of the Standard and devise an overall best 
practice solution for implementation within the broader FI. For business units within the FI that are 
51 
 
minimally impacted by the Standard, cost saving can be achieved as it may not be necessary to 
employ specialist resources to perform these tasks but rather leverage of the solutions devised by 
this broader working group. Staff costs can be saved and effiencey created as there will be no need 
to employ staff to manage the remediation of the pre-existing accounts. In larger FI it is very likely 
that a centralised area within the FI will be responsible for the remediation of all pre-existing 
account holders from the various business units within the FI. This central remediation will be 
adequately staffed and fully trained to handle all account types and customer queries.  
 
Relying on existing customer data 
If possible the FI can also rely on existing customer data that has been collected through other 
compliance related functions such as KYC, AML and FATCA. This can save the FI a significant amount 
of time and operational costs involved with having to contact each account holder and controlling 
person/s and subsequently re-collecting this data. This approach would also result in an improved 
customer experience and will also save considerable amounts of time in supplying the same 
information. Care must be taken as the Standard only allows data already on file to be used on 
certain categories of financial accounts.  
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   N
o. 
Cost Driver/Activity 
Functional Area in FI 
N
um
ber of 
resources 
allocated 
to task 
Budgeted Tim
e 
allocated per a 
task (Hours) 
 
Actual Tim
e 
Spent per task 
(Hours) 
 
Variance 
analysis 
(Hours) 
 
Reason for variances 
1 
Interpretation of regulations 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
 1 
 12 
 
15 
  -3 
Additional tim
e 
required to consider 
item
s not explicitly 
contained in 
regulations.  
2 
Interpretation and drafting of 
data requirem
ent specifications 
for SARS reporting 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
10 
12 
  -2 
3 
Drafting of business requirem
ent 
specifications for system
 
developm
ent 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
5 
5 
 0 
 
4 
System
 developm
ent 
IT Project team
  
1 
25 
30 
 -5 
Delays experienced in 
developm
ent on the 
side of the service 
provider. 
5 
Design of Tax residency self-
certification form
s 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
10 
8 
 2 
 
M
arketing and public 
relations 
1 
5 
4 
 1 
 
Legal 
1 
4 
2 
2 
 
6 
Design of custom
er 
com
m
unications 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
10 
8 
 2 
 
M
arketing and public 
relations 
1 
5 
4 
 1 
 
Legal 
1 
4 
2 
2 
 
7 
Drafting of Data requirem
ents 
specifications to  conduct im
pact 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
5 
4 
 1 
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analysis 
Business Intelligence 
analyst 
1 
3 
2 
 1 
 
8 
Drafting of CRS project plan 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
5 
5 
 0 
 
9 
Process design and risk analysis 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
8 
6 
 2 
 
Process engineer 
1 
4 
2 
2 
 
10 
Design of training m
aterial for 
staff 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
5 
5 
 0 
 
Learning and 
developm
ent 
1 
2 
2 
 0 
 
11 
Training sessions for im
pacted 
staff 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
2 
2 
 0 
 
12 
Rem
ediation of pre-existing 
custom
er base 
Rem
ediation team
 
5 
125* 
125* 
 0 
These num
bers have 
been estim
ated as the 
activities had not 
com
m
enced at the 
tim
e of subm
ission of 
this paper. 
13 
M
onitoring and Q
uality 
Assurance of self-certification 
form
s 
Tax subject m
atter 
expert 
1 
30** 
30** 
  0 
14 
Building and Testing of 
subm
ission file to SARS 
Business Intelligence 
analyst 
1 
25*** 
25*** 
 0 
Total hours  
304 
298 
 
 
Cost at a charge out rate of R 545 per hour 
R 165,680 
R 162,410 
 
 
 
Table 1.5 
* The tim
e is based on 250 accounts that needed to be rem
ediated across the FI. It is estim
ated that each account should take a total of 30 m
inutes to rem
ediate. 
**The tim
e is based on 250 accounts that needed to undergo Q
uality Assurance (Q
A) in the FI. It is estim
ated that each account should take a total of 5 - 8 m
inutes for Q
A. 
*** Estim
ated based on tim
e spent during the building and testing of the FATCA file to SARS during the 2016 3rd party subm
issions.
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Chapter Six: Benefits and challenges faced by developing tax jurisdictions with CRS    
implementation 
Despite the challenges of FIs having to look beyond just the Standard in ensuring successful 
implementation, why did South Africa sign on as early adopter to the Standard? To further 
understand this, it will be necessary to analyse the benefits that may be derived by a jurisdiction in 
implementing this Standard. In addition, the challenges of implementation in other developing 
jurisdictions similar to South Africa should also be considered to understand if South Africa is 
capable of overcoming these challenges.  
 
The following key benefits will be realised for developing countries that choose to implement AEOI. 
 
Detection of tax evasion and offshore wealth: 
Detection of tax evasion is critical for developing countries in particular: US$8.5 trillion of household 
assets are held abroad. In 2012, more than 25% of all Latin American and almost 33% of all Middle 
Eastern and African household wealth was held abroad compared to the worldwide average of 6%. 
Estimates of tax revenue and illicit financial flows lost by developing countries generally range in the 
hundreds of billions of US dollars per year, exceeding the amount of official development assistance. 
(OECD, 2014(b): 9) 
 
AEOI can alert tax administrations to tax evasion that was previously unknown and unknowable, 
potentially raising substantial revenue: 
AEOI may also assist in de-politicizing compliance actions taken against high profile individuals, as 
the source of information is external to the domestic tax administration. Unlike EOI (Exchange of 
information) on request which requires substantial efforts on the part of tax administrations to 
investigate cases and establish foreseeable relevance in each case in order to obtain information, 
AEOI can achieve efficiencies in information gathering for tax administrations. This is one reason that 
AEOI can be suitable for developing countries which face capacity constraints. (OECD, 2014(b): 9)  
 
Deterrence from future non-compliance:  
AEOI should deter tax evasion and encourage timely compliance by taxpayers where taxpayers are 
aware that financial institutions will report directly to the tax administration. Many Global Forum 
members reported this as a key benefit of AEOI and evidence supports this conclusion. For example, 
in Denmark, a 2010 study found that tax evasion occurred only in 0.3% of cases where income was 
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subject to third-party reporting, but in 37% cases for self-reported income. In the US, 99% 
compliance was achieved for individuals whose income was reported to the tax administration by 
financial institutions whereas misreporting by individuals was found in 56% of cases in which there 
was little or no third party reporting. (OECD, 2014(b): 9)  
 
Support domestic synergies:  
The Standard relies on financial institutions to report information to the tax administration. In this 
sense, it is an extension of a growing trend among tax administrations around the world to use third 
party information reporting to assist with tax compliance. The implementation of the Standard may 
provide an opportunity for tax administrations to enhance domestic compliance. That is, a 
jurisdiction may choose to design its implementing legislation to require that financial institutions 
report information on both domestic and foreign residents (and this may in fact be a simpler process 
for financial institutions to manage), thereby enhancing the breadth of information automatically 
available to the tax administration. Capacity building efforts in tax administration modernisation 
may be helpful to assist developing countries in designing the requisite systems to enable the use of 
information received both from domestic and international sources in their tax compliance efforts. 
As the Standard builds on anti-money laundering frameworks, implementing the Standard is an 
opportunity to strengthen and improve these practices, assisting with the detection of illicit 
activities. Furthermore, improved performance of the tax administration and anti-money laundering 
institutions in turn builds morale amongst citizens and complements other state-building efforts. 
(OECD, 2014(b): 10)  
 
Enhance reputation:  
It is clear that the G20 sees AEOI as the new global standard with which jurisdictions should comply 
as part of their responsibilities towards the global financial system. Participating in the Standard 
demonstrates a continuing commitment to transparency and to tackling tax evasion and the flow of 
illicit funds. It is concrete evidence of a jurisdiction’s commitment to improving both domestic and 
international tax compliance, and indicative of the quality and capacity of its institutions. 
Furthermore, participating in AEOI will require regular exchanges and the building of wide networks 
of co-operation between tax administrations, in a way that EOI on request may not (for example, 
where certain jurisdictions rarely receive or send requests). (OECD, 2014(b): 10) 
 
Many developing countries are not currently in a position to benefit from AEOI. Examining responses 
of developing countries (excluding for this purpose G20, OECD and Early Adopters) to a Global 
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Forum survey indicates that only 3 developing countries are currently sending information 
automatically, compared to 50 developed countries. The survey also revealed that 17 developing 
countries had received information automatically, although in general they considered it to be less 
useful as compared to developed countries, largely on account of limited capacity to match and use 
the information received.  The World Bank Group reported on the key challenges faced by 
developing countries in implementing AEOI: the urgency of other basic domestic reforms; high costs 
of information technology infrastructure; human resources needs for analysing and using received 
data efficiently; difficulty of making legislative changes; and limited awareness of exchange of 
information practices (especially amongst low income countries, many of which are not Global 
Forum members and have not yet committed to or been assisted in meeting the standard on EOI on 
Request). (OECD, 2014(b):12)  
 
The findings in a study conducted by the Tax Justice Network were aimed at finding out the views on 
AEOI from developing countries.  The survey was sent to 37 developing countries on all continents, 
either to the tax authorities or to relevant contacts that are or were involved in these countries’ tax 
authorities or ministries of finance. Responses were received from 8 jurisdictions: 3 from Africa, 3 
from Latin America and 2 from Asia. The developing countries that participated were Argentina, 
China, Costa Rica, Honduras, Liberia, Morocco, Pakistan and Uganda. It seems that many developing 
countries are aware of and interested in AEOI, acknowledge its potential benefits, and express clear 
preferences for its design and capacity building needs. (Tax Justice Network, 2014: 30) 
 
The following two key survey questions will further highlight the views of other developing 
countries: 
 
Arguments in favour of implementing AEOI: 
46% of respondents believed that AEOI would deter taxpayers from future non-compliance. 34% 
indicated that this would assist in collection of tax revenues as tax evasion would become more 
difficult. 10% suggested that it would help against corruption and 10% felt that not being part of the 
AEOI would place additional pressure on their respective governments to comply and adopt the 
AEOI standard. (Tax Justice Network, 2014: 31) 
 
Arguments against implementing AEOI: 
A lack of capacity seems to be the key matter that could prevent developing countries from usefully 
implementing AEOI. These are exemplified by the top three priorities: limited resources to analyse 
information (28%), followed by limited resources to send information (27%) and the lack of IT 
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technology or electronic records (26%). Difficulties in providing information to other countries was a 
relevant argument, suggesting that non-reciprocity provisions would help reduce the barriers to 
developing countries’ participation in AEOI. The fourth argument was that ‘other countries not 
joining affect a jurisdiction’s competitive advantage’ (12%), indicating the virulent logic of ‘tax wars,’ 
otherwise known as harmful tax competition. The last option that ‘costs will be greater than 
benefits’ (7%), was only chosen by a few jurisdictions. This suggests that most countries are 
convinced that AEOI’s benefits are greater than its costs. The sceptics show that there is a need for 
more and better studies, including quantitative estimates about the potential revenue and 
investment benefits. (Tax Justice Network, 2014: 32) 
 
The findings in the independent report released by Tax Justice Network therefore validate the key 
perceived benefits and challenges of AEOI implementation in developing jurisdictions as highlighted 
by the OECD. 
 
SARS and the CRS 
As per SARS (2016, (a)), South Africa currently has 8 bilateral tax information exchange agreements 
in place, whilst another 10 are currently either in the process of being negotiated or finalised but not 
yet signed by either party. It is therefore submitted that based on the current bilateral agreements 
and the expectation to sign and complete a few more in the near future, the South African Tax 
authorities do derive some value from the sharing of tax information. Furthermore, considering 
information sharing is already being in place, is it expected that SARS would already have both the 
staff and infrastructure in place to handle any form of data exchange required and as such has to an 
extent addressed the primary concerns raised by other developing countries i.e. resourcing capacity 
and IT infrastructure.  
 
In addition the SARS Special Voluntary Disclosure programme (SVDP) which will run from 1 October 
2016 to 31 August 2017 will give individuals and companies who have in the past not disclosed tax 
and exchange control defaults in relation to offshore assets an opportunity to voluntary disclose the 
assets and regularise their affairs with SARS and thereby potentially avoid the imposition of 
understatement and other administrative penalties (SARS, 2016(b)). The SVDP is therefore seen 
largely to go hand in hand with the CRS. The Minister of Finance also announced in his budget 
speech in February 2016 that unacceptable transfer pricing practices and treaty shopping amongst 
other areas will receive further special attention. SARS, through the use of country by country 
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information sharing agreements, will be able to identify aggressive or abusive tax planning. These 
sorts of initiatives highlight the urgency and drive of the National Treasury and SARS to combat the 
concealment of offshore assets. The dire need to increase revenue collection through taxes to 
effectively manage South Africa’s national debt and means tax information sharing agreements are 
therefore a top priority. The success of these initiatives are then reliant on cooperation with other 
tax jurisdictions as the information shared will help to identify any errant taxpayers that have not 
made use of the SVDP. National Treasury were then left with very little alternative but to sign on as 
early adopters to the CRS in order to derive full value out of these initiatives.  
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Chapter Seven: Loopholes and possible ways to escape the net of CRS 
For South Africa to benefit from adopting the AEOI, the ability and consistent application of the 
OECD standard is critical across all tax jurisdictions otherwise taxpayers will make use of the 
loopholes and short-comings of this piece of legislation as applied in their respective jurisdictions. 
This chapter will explore some of the loopholes that exist in the current OECD Standard for the 
Automatic Exchange of Information as published by the OECD and how tax evaders may use them to 
escape being reported in jurisdictions where they are tax resident. 
According to Morris (2017) tax evaders could exploit 16 actual loopholes and 8 ambiguities in the 
OECD standard to retain secrecy on cross-border accounts.  Some of these are highlighted below. 
 
Residence by investment certificate 
 
The beneficial owner avoids the definition of Reportable Jurisdiction Person by either:  
 
(i) Obtaining synthetic residence-by-investment certificates to emulate being a fiscal resident in 
the same jurisdiction as the reporting FI; or  
(ii) Structuring an untaxed Investment Entity to be managed in the same jurisdiction of the 
beneficial owner. (Morris; 2017:6) 
 
The weakness in the Standard is that documentary evidence is “a certificate of residence issued by 
an authorised government body (for example, a government or agency thereof, or a municipality) of 
the jurisdiction in which the payee claims to be a resident. FIs interpret this need not be a fiscal 
resident certificate, but merely a certificate of residence. Furthermore, many FIs ignore that the 
residence test must have the current address on record such as utility bill, and simply rely on the 
certificate of residence, even if it is not a fiscal tax resident certificate. (Morris; 2017:6) 
 
Commonly used residence-by-investment schemes in certain jurisdictions to circumvent the CRS are:  
 
Dubai:  
Globally by far, the most prevalently used residence-by-investment scheme to circumvent 
reporting is the United Arab Emirates through its Free Trade Zone residence certificates. 
Banks, Custodial Institutions and Trustees help their clients incorporate a Dubai company in 
the Free Trade Zone to get a certificate of residence, and then rent a flexi-desk (not even an 
office) and telephone-line to show they are physically resident in Dubai. As the account 
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holder / controlling person is “resident” in the same jurisdiction as the Dubai FI, there is no 
reporting. (Morris; 2017:7) 
 
The Bahamas:  
FIs work in tandem with Bahamian property developers who will, for an annual fee, provide 
a property lease agreement and utility bill such as telephone land-line, thereby satisfying the 
documentary evidence for the residence test. (Morris; 2017:7)  
 
Andorra:  
Andorra FIs assist their clients to obtain a Passive Residence Certificate. This is achieved by 
staying in Andorra for less than 181 days but more than 90 days a year. It is emphasised 
there is no border controls to monitor movements out of the country. This passive residence 
certificate is not a fiscal residence, merely the right to stay short-term in the country without 
employment. Nevertheless, FIs accept the passive residence certificate for CRS purposes. 
(Morris; 2017:7) 
 
Panama:  
Clients of banks with three year deposits of at least USD 300,000 may avail of a non-fiscal 
residence permit. (Morris; 2017:7) 
 
Passive NFE maintains Account in a Non-Participating Jurisdiction 
In this scenario a tax evader uses a CRS jurisdiction Passive Non-Financial Entity to hold accounts in a 
non-participating jurisdiction like the United States. This is a problematic loophole to tackle because 
neither the NFE, nor the Non-Participating FI reports. (Morris; 2017:12) 
 
Untaxed Foreign Investment Entity maintaining an offshore account, managed in same jurisdiction 
as Equity Interest 
 
A significant structural deficiency of the OECD standard is that it does not cover foreign untaxed 
Investment Entities, structured so that management is resident in the same jurisdiction as the Equity 
Interest Account Holders. A fundamental flaw of the Standard is to omit covering this strategy 
because most tax evaders currently hold their undeclared offshore accounts in foreign Investment 
Entities they manage. The most common entity used to hold an undeclared account is an offshore 
company with the portfolios managed by a bank. This, as an Investment Entity is out of scope of the 
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CRS because the manager does not report on himself, as he is in the same jurisdiction. (Morris; 
2017:9) 
 
FIs encouraging potential clients to shift accounts to related Non-Participating Jurisdiction FI  
FIs predominantly trust service providers, assist clients to close their accounts and open new 
accounts in a related FI in Non-Participating Jurisdiction. (Morris; 2017:16) 
The chief culprits FIs shifting clients to Non-Participating Jurisdictions are the global trust companies 
who have recently obtained trust licenses in the USA, with South Dakota being the most popular 
location. The FI, in cahoots with the client, ignores the CRS anti-avoidance guideline of not adopting 
procedures and practises to circumvent reporting, under the legal consensus that anti-avoidance is 
not effective before a competent authority arrangement (CAA) is implemented. Banks have covertly 
followed the same strategy as trust companies in getting clients to close their accounts and open an 
account with the bank’s related US bank. (Morris; 2017:16) 
 
Tax evaders seek alternate asset classes  
The OECD Standard excludes certain Financial Accounts from review because ostensibly they possess 
low-risk characteristics for being used for tax evasion. Elsewhere the Standard does not cover certain 
assets or payments as reportable. These chinks in the armour are being exploited and thus have 
transformed from being low-risk to high risk products used for tax evasion (Morris; 2017:24). This is 
achieved in the following way: 
 
The OECD Standard includes only financial assets. Therefore, tax evaders seek alternate asset classes 
which emulate Financial Assets. The two most common asset substitutes are gold and real estate 
(Morris; 2017:28). It has also been noted by (Morris; 2017:29) that there has been an increase in 
companies established in tax havens which store gold for clients as well as a large number of clients 
having liquidated their undeclared financial assets and have bought property.  
 
Late adopter shopping 
Tax evaders are flowing to jurisdictions that have indicated they will not be signing CAAs in the near 
term due to fabricated excuses such as confidentiality or other pre-conditions. (Morris; 2017:40) 
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Creation of an additional year for due-diligence on low value accounts 
 
The OECD gave early adopters an extra year to do due diligence on low value accounts. Yet some 
late adopter countries have abused the extra year rule, to sneak in an extra year for due diligence on 
low value accounts. This is in effect a two-year delay or a late-late adopter for low value accounts. 
(Morris; 2017:44)  
 
Confidentiality 
Tax havens abuse the bilateral option using subjective, fabricated and fallacious data 
security concerns, or impose irrelevant preconditions. Switzerland, Bahamas, Singapore, 
Panama, undertake their own subjective confidentiality and data security assessment of 
potential partner jurisdictions. (Morris; 2017:44) 
 
Preconditions for signing a CAA 
Switzerland (for example) is demanding potential partners agree to unrelated conditions 
before considering a CAA. The two most important demands are: 
  
(i) the partner country grant access to Switzerland’s banks to local markets 
and,  
(ii) an amnesty be in place for residents with undeclared accounts.  
 
Although the OECD encourages tax amnesties, this is not a pre-requisite requirement for 
CAAs. (Morris; 2017:46) 
 
USA voids the CRS 
Morris estimates that over 80% of persons wishing to avoid the Common Reporting Standard simply 
move their accounts to a USA Financial Institution, whether it be a bank, Custodial Institution, trust 
or fund. The OECD closing the Standard’s loopholes identified in this report will merely cause an 
expedited flow of undeclared assets to the USA.  FIs subject to the CRS have a legitimate gripe that 
the USA is not subject to equivalent reciprocal automatic exchange of information. Consequently, 
the CRS is chasing untaxed money to US FI. The CRS FIs rightly complain that eventually when or if 
the USA reciprocates equivalent information, the fleeing accounts will remain in the USA as the last 
stop. Therefore, the CRS is unfairly causing permanent loss of business for CRS FIs because the USA is 
the last adopter of AEOI. (Morris; 2017:2) 
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Fortunately from a South African perspective, a signed CAA is in place with the United States of 
America (which was achieved through the implementation of FATCA reporting in South Africa) and it 
is therefore submitted that this will help mitigate the risk of South African tax evaders wishing to 
hide undeclared assets in the United States going undetected. Work however will still need to be 
done to put in place information sharing agreements between other late and non-adopters of the 
CRS some of which are referred to above. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
Based on the discussion above the following is an executive summary of the key findings of this 
report: 
 
A significant amount of effort is required on the part of the FI in first interpreting and understanding 
the requirements of the Standard and its applicability to the various product types and service 
offerings within a FI. Any matters unique to a product category that has not been explicitly covered 
in the Standard should be raised with the relevant industry bodies like SARS and the Banking 
Association of South Africa for further clarity and guidance. 
 
Once this has been done it will be necessary for the FI to design and develop a standard operating 
procedure that will need to be rolled out into business to ensure the relevant due diligence 
procedures of the Standard are complied with. An understanding of the SARS reporting BRS will also 
be required as this will provide the FI with an appropriate guideline for system development, the 
report submission to SARS as well the design of the tax residency self-certification forms.   
 
The importance of creating staff and customer awareness around the requirements and implications 
of being non-compliant with CRS cannot be underestimated. Failure to address either of these areas 
will result in the FI facing a daunting task in addressing any shortcomings of staff in applying the 
correct due diligence procedures and will not create the urgency required on the part of account 
holders providing the required information. Needless to say these then have potential to create 
avoidable financial and reputational risks for the FI. 
 
The FI will also need to ensure that all the relevant areas of both internal and external governance 
processes have been addressed. A full risk assessment together with the identification of risk 
mitigation mechanisms should also be designed and documented and all data used, validated. 
Privacy and the protection of account holder data is of the utmost importance and extra care should 
be taken by the FI to ensure that is has played its part in keeping this data confidential and in line 
with requirements of POPI. 
 
Costs associated with the implementation of CRS should also be measured and regularly scrutinized. 
Some organisations adopt an attitude of paying no or very little regard to cost implications when it 
comes to the implementation of compliance related projects. Whilst the financial penalties 
associated with non-compliance will probably outweigh the costs of implementation, failure to 
65 
 
adequately plan and budget creates significant delays in implementation and fail to highlight the 
need for additional resources if required. Thought should also be given to ways and means to reduce 
costs and whether or not it may be possible to provide other value added services to customer in 
order to recoup some of these costs. 
 
The planning around a remediation exercise for the pre-existing account holder and controlling 
persons is key. This needs to be completed with minimal impact on customers of a FI. The FI will also 
need to ensure that the customer data that will be used is accurate and can be relied on. Decisions 
as to whether to make use of service providers to conduct this exercise should also be made after 
the relevant due diligence procedures have been carried out on these service providers and as early 
on in the process as possible. 
 
It is quite clear that implementing CRS involves much more than just the collating of account holder 
information and reporting it to SARS. The FI faces numerous other interpretative and operational 
challenges to ensure that it has ticked all the relevant boxes before the first round of reports are 
submitted to SARS in May 2017. Ultimately this leaves the FI with a lot to do in a very short space of 
time. Whilst this is no doubt a challenge for FIs, the benefits to be derived from the implementation 
of CRS in a developing country like South Africa are apparent. One of the aims of National Treasury is 
to combat tax evasion through tax dodging citizens hiding wealth offshore, thereby creating 
additional tax contributions to the fiscus. Given the current state of economic affairs, the threats of a 
ratings downgrade and the sudden need to make additional funding available for tertiary education, 
it is necessary that the Treasury explore every avenue possible in order to maximise collections. If 
the CRS proves fruitful in identifying South African taxpayers who are not paying taxes on foreign 
assets and result in increased collections of revenue through interest, penalties and taxes this may 
alleviate the immediate need for further hikes in personal income tax rates. These sorts of tax rate 
hikes place additional burdens on the South African middle class, the majority of whom are 
compliant with their tax affairs. 
 
To conclude, it is submitted that South Africa’s decision to sign on as early adopters to the Standard 
is based on the perceived benefits described in chapter six above as well as the alignment of other 
tax evasion combating strategies such as the SVDP. It is hoped however that the information 
received from other early adopter jurisdictions is of the required quality which will allow the SARS to 
utilise it to make informed decisions resulting in the desired outputs and benefits to be realised.  
 
 
66 
 
Reference List 
 
Articles 
 
KPMG (2016), The Common Reporting Standard as it applies in South Africa, viewed on 16 November 
2016 from https://www.sablog.kpmg.co.za/2016/06/common-reporting-standard-applies-south-
africa  
 
South African Revenue Service (2016 (a)), Summary of all tax information exchange agreements, 
viewed on 17 November 2016 from http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Agreements/LAPD-
IntA-EIA-2013-01%20-
%20Status%20Summary%20of%20all%20Tax%20Information%20Exchange%20Agreements.pdf 
South African Revenue Service (2016 (b)), Voluntary Disclosure Programme, viewed on 16 November 
2016 from http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/VDP/Pages/default.aspx  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (n.d. (a)), Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, viewed 1 August 2016 from 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/automaticexchangeofinformation.htm  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (n.d. (b)), Four steps to implement the 
Standard - Global Forum on Transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes viewed on 9 
November 2016 fromhttps://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/technical-assistance/aeoi/steps-to-
implement-aeoi-standard.pdf 
Tax Justice Network (n.d), Who we are, viewed on 8 November 2016 from 
http://www.taxjustice.net/about/who-we-are/ 
Workpool (n.d.), What is POPI? The Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act explained, viewed 
on 15 November 2016 from https://www.workpool.co/featured/popi.  
 
Dictionaries and Encyclopaedias 
BusinessDictionary.com, viewed on 27 November 2016 from http://www.businessdictionary.com/  
 
Collins Dictionary of Law, (2006), viewed on 27 November 2016 from http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com.  
 
West's Encyclopaedia of American Law, (2008) 2nd edition viewed on 27 November 2016 
from http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com.  
 
Journals and Publications  
Baker P, (2016), The Rights to confidentiality and privacy in an age of transparency: A European 
perspective, viewed on 23 March 2017 from http://www.fieldtax.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/9th-May-2016-Privacy-Rights-in-an-Age-of-Transparency-A-European-
Perspective-.pdf.  
 
 
67 
 
European Union, Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union (2015), First Report of the 
Commission AEFI expert group on the implementation of Directive 2014/107/EU for Automatic 
Exchange of Financial Account Information, viewed on 23 March 2017 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/tax_coop
eration/mutual_assistance/financial_account/first_report_expert_group_automatic_exchange_fina
ncial_information.pdf.  
Glynn L, Fenergo, (2016), CRS – Implementing Best Practice for Tax Compliance, viewed on 23 March 
2017 from https://www.fenergo.com/resources/whitepapers/crs-implementing-best-practice-for-
compliance.html.  
Knoble A and Meinzer M, Tax Justice Network, (2014), Automatic Exchange of Information: An 
opportunity for developing countries to tackle tax evasion and corruption, viewed on 23 March 2017 
from http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/AIE-An-opportunity-for-developing-
countries.pdf.  
Morris M, (2017), The 24 OECD Common Reporting Standard Loopholes, Suggested improvements 
and Refinements, viewed on 11 April 2017 from http://www.the-best-of-both-worlds.com/support-
files/oecd-crs-loopholes-report.pdf.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2014(a)), Standard for Automatic 
Exchange of Financial Account Information, Common Reporting Standard, viewed on 23 March 2017 
from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-financial-
account-information-common-reporting-standard.pdf.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2014(b)), Global Forum on transparency 
& exchange of information for tax purposes, Automatic exchange of information: A Roadmap for 
developing country participation – Final report to the G20 development working group, viewed on 23 
March 2017 from http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/global-forum-AEOI-roadmap-for-
developing-countries.pdf.   
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016), Guidance for Financial Institutions 
requesting the form, viewed on 23 March 2017 from https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-
exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/CRS_ENTITIES_Self-Cert_Form.pdf.  
Rand Merchant Bank (RMB), (n.d), Appendix: Definitions and Glossary of Terms, Common Reporting 
Standard, viewed on 23 March 2017 from http://www.rmb.co.za/PDFs/CRS/glossary.pdf.  
Government Reports 
Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette No 10573, Vol. 609, 2 March 2016, The OECD 
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters. 
South African Revenue Service, Business Requirements Specifications, Automatic Exchange of 
Information, v 2.0.0, 29th February 2016. 
Statutes 
Republic of South Africa 
Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1998. 
 
68 
 
Appendix A 
These definitions have been taken directly from the Standard as contained in the Government 
Gazette, Republic of South Africa, No 10573, Vol. 609, 2 March 2016, The OECD Standard for 
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (with the relevant section 
numbers included) unless otherwise stated. 
TIN  Tax Identification Number. The term TIN means Taxpayer Identification 
Number or a functional equivalent in the absence of a TIN. (s.8, Para. E, 
ss.5) 
Financial 
Institution         
The term financial institution means a custodial institution, a depository 
institution, an investment entity, or a specified insurance company. (s.8, 
Para. A, ss.3) 
Participating 
Jurisdiction 
Financial 
Institution  
The term ‘Participating Jurisdiction Financial Institution’ means (i) any 
Financial Institution that is resident in a Participating Jurisdiction, but 
excludes any branch of that Financial Institution that is located outside 
such Participating Jurisdiction, and (ii) any branch of a Financial 
Institution that is not resident in a Participating Jurisdiction, if that 
branch is located in such Participating Jurisdiction.                       (s.8, Para. 
A, ss.2) 
Reporting 
financial 
Institution 
Any South African Financial institution that is not a non-reporting 
Financial Institution. The term South African Financial institution means 
(i) any Financial institution that is resident in South Africa, but excludes 
any branch of the Financial Institution that is located outside of South 
Africa; and (ii) any branch of a Financial institution that is not resident in 
South Africa, if that branch is located in South Africa.  
(s.8, Para. A, ss.1) 
Non-Reporting 
Financial 
Institution  
A Non-Reporting Financial Institution’ means any Financial Institution 
that is:  
a) a Governmental Entity, International Organisation or Central Bank, 
other than with respect to a payment that is derived from an 
obligation held in connection with a commercial financial activity of a 
type engaged in by a Specified Insurance Company, Custodial 
Institution, or Depository Institution;  
b) a Broad Participation Retirement Fund; a Narrow Participation 
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Retirement Fund; a Pension Fund of a Governmental Entity, 
International Organisation or Central Bank; or a Qualified Credit Card 
Issuer;  
c) any other Entity that presents a low risk of being used to evade tax, 
has substantially similar characteristics to any of the Entities 
described in subparagraphs B(1)(a) and (b), and is included in the list 
of Non Reporting Financial Institutions referred to in Annex I to these 
Regulations as a Non-Reporting Financial Institution, provided that 
the status of such Entity as a Non-Reporting Financial Institution does 
not frustrate the purposes of the Common Reporting Standard; 
d) an Exempt Collective Investment Vehicle; or  
e) A Trust established under the laws of a Reportable Jurisdiction to the 
extent that the trustee of the Trust is a Reporting Financial institution 
and reports all information required to be reported with respect to 
all Reportable Accounts of the Trust.  
(s.8, Para. B, ss.1(a-e)) 
NFE  Non-Financial-Entity (s.8, Para. D, ss.7) 
Passive NFE  Under the CRS a ‘Passive NFE’ means any: (I) NFE that is not an Active 
NFE; or (ii) an Investment Entity described in subparagraph A (6) (b) 
Section 8 of the CRS that is not a participating jurisdiction financial 
institution. (s.8, Para. D, ss.8) 
Active NFE  An Entity will be classified as an ACTIVE NFE if it meets any of the 
following criteria: 
a) less than 50% of the NFE’s gross income for the preceding calendar 
year or other appropriate reporting period is passive income and less 
than 50% of the assets held by the NFE during the preceding calendar 
year or other appropriate reporting period are assets that produce or 
are held for the production of passive income;  
b)  the stock of the NFE is regularly traded on an established securities 
market or the NFE is a Related entity of an entity the stock of which is 
regularly traded on established securities market. 
c) the NFE is a Governmental Entity, an International Organisation, a 
Central Bank, or an Entity wholly owned by one or more of the 
foregoing;  
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d) substantially all of the activities of the NFE consist of holding (in 
whole or in part) the outstanding stock of, or providing financing and 
services to, one or more subsidiaries that engage in trades or 
businesses other than the business of a Financial Institution, except 
that an Entity does not qualify for this status if the Entity functions 
(or holds itself out) as an investment fund, such as a private equity 
fund, venture capital fund, leveraged buyout fund, or any investment 
vehicle whose purpose is to acquire or fund companies and then hold 
interests in those companies as capital assets for investment 
purposes;  
e) the NFE is not yet operating a business and has no prior operating 
history, but is investing capital into assets with the intent to operate 
a business other than that of a Financial Institution, provided that the 
NFE does not qualify for this exception after the date that is 24 
months after the date of the initial organisation of the NFE; 
f) the NFE was not a Financial Institution in the past five years, and is in 
the process of liquidating its assets or is reorganising with the intent 
to continue or recommence operations in a business other than that 
of a Financial Institution;  
g) the NFE primarily engages in financing and hedging transactions with, 
or for, Related Entities that are not Financial Institutions, and does 
not provide financing or hedging services to any Entity that is not a 
Related Entity, provided that the group of any such Related Entities is 
primarily engaged in a business other than that of a Financial 
Institution; or  
h) the NFE meets all of the following requirements:  
i) it is established and operated in its jurisdiction of residence 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, cultural, 
athletic, or educational purposes; or it is established and operated in 
its jurisdiction of residence and it is a professional organisation, 
business league, chamber of commerce, labour organisation, 
agricultural or horticultural organisation, civic league or an 
organisation operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare;  
ii) it is exempt from income tax in its jurisdiction of residence;  
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iii) it has no shareholders or members who have a proprietary or 
beneficial interest in its income or assets;  
iv) the applicable laws of the NFE’s jurisdiction of residence or the NFE’s 
formation documents do not permit any income or assets of the NFE 
to be distributed to, or applied for the benefit of, a private person or 
non-charitable Entity other than pursuant to the conduct of the NFE’s 
charitable activities, or as payment of reasonable compensation for 
services rendered, or as payment representing the fair market value 
of property which the NFE has purchased; and  
v) The applicable laws of the NFE’s jurisdiction of residence or the NFE’s 
formation documents require that, upon the NFE’s liquidation or 
dissolution, all of its assets be distributed to a Governmental Entity or 
other non-profit organisation, or escheat to the government of the 
NFE’s jurisdiction of residence or any political subdivision thereof. (s. 
8, Para. D, ss. 9(a-h)) 
Settlor One who establishes a trust, a right of property, real or personal, held 
and administered by a trustee for the benefit of another (West’s  
Encyclopaedia of American Law, 2008). 
Controlling 
person(s)  
Controlling persons means the natural person(s) who exercise control 
over an entity. In the case of a trust, the controlling person may be the 
settlor(s), the trustee(s), the protector(s) (if any), the beneficiary/ies or 
class/es of beneficiaries, or any other natural person(s) exercising 
ultimate effective control over the trust, and in the case of a legal 
arrangement other than a Trust, such term means persons in equivalent 
or similar positions. The term Controlling persons must be interpreted in 
a manner consistent with the Financial Action Task Force 
recommendations. (s. 8, Para. D, ss. 6)  
Entity  The term entity means a legal person or a legal arrangement, such as a 
corporation, organisation, partnership, trust or foundation. (s. 8, Para. E, 
ss. 3) 
Account holder  The account holder is the person listed or identified as the holder of a 
financial account by the financial institution that maintains the account. 
(s. 8, Para. E, ss. 1) 
Financial account  A financial account is an account maintained by a financial institution and 
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includes the following: Depository Accounts; Custodial Accounts; Equity 
and debt interest in certain Investment Entities; Cash Value Insurance 
Contracts; and Annuity Contracts.  (s. 8, Para. C, ss. 1(a-c))  
Reportable 
Account 
A financial account that is maintained by a Reporting financial institution 
and is held by one or more reportable persons or by a Passive NFE with 
one or more controlling persons that is a reportable person provided it 
has been identified as such pursuant to the due diligence procedures 
described in sections 2 to 7 of the Standard.  
(s. 8, Para. D, ss. 1) 
Reportable 
person  
A reportable jurisdiction person other than:  
(i) a corporation the stock of which is regularly traded on one or more 
established securities markets;  
(ii) any corporation that is a related entity of a corporation described in 
clause (i);  
(iii) a governmental entity;  
(iv) an international organisation;  
(v) a central bank; or  
(vi) A financial institution. (s. 8, Para. D, ss. 2) 
Reportable 
jurisdiction  
A Reportable jurisdiction is any jurisdiction other than the United States 
of America or South Africa. (s. 8, Para. D, ss. 4)  
Reportable 
jurisdiction 
Person  
A reportable jurisdiction Person is an individual or Entity that is resident 
in a Reportable jurisdiction under the tax laws of such jurisdiction, or an 
estate of a decedent that was a resident of a Reportable Jurisdiction. For 
this purpose, an Entity such as a partnership, limited liability partnership 
or similar legal arrangement that has no residence for tax purposes shall 
be treated as resident in the jurisdiction in which its place of effective 
management is situated. (s. 8, Para. D, ss. 3) 
Excluded 
Accounts 
(a) A retirement or pension account that satisfies the following 
requirements: 
(i) The account is subject to regulation as a personal retirement account 
or is part of a registered or regulated retirement or pension plan for the 
provision of retirement or pension benefits (including disability or death 
benefits); 
(ii) The account is tax-favoured (i.e., contributions to the account that 
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would otherwise be subject to tax are deductible or excluded from the 
gross income of the account holder or taxed at a reduced rate, or 
taxation of investment income from the account is deferred or taxed at a 
reduced rate); 
(iii) Information reporting is required to the tax authorities with respect 
to the account; 
(iv) Withdrawals are conditioned on reaching a specified retirement age, 
disability, or death, or penalties apply to withdrawals made before such 
specified events; and  
(v) Either  
(i) annual contributions are limited to $50,000 or less, or  
(ii) there is a maximum lifetime contribution limit to the account of 
$1,000,000 or less, in each case applying the rules set forth in paragraph 
C of Section VII for account aggregation and currency translation. 
 
A Financial Account that otherwise satisfies the requirements of 
subparagraph C(17)(a)(v) will not fail to satisfy such requirements solely 
because such Financial Account may receive assets or funds transferred 
from one or more Financial Accounts that meet the requirements of 
subparagraph C(17)(a) or (b) or from one or more retirement or pension 
funds that meet the requirements of any of subparagraphs B(5) through 
(7). 
 
(b) An account that satisfies the following requirements: 
(i) The account is subject to regulation as an investment vehicle for 
purposes other than for retirement and is regularly traded on an 
established securities market, or the account is subject to regulation as a 
savings vehicle for purposes other than for 
retirement; 
(ii) The account is tax-favoured (i.e. contributions to the account that 
would otherwise be subject to tax are deductible or excluded from the 
gross income of the account holder or taxed at a reduced rate, or 
taxation of investment income from the account is deferred or taxed at a 
reduced rate); 
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(iii) Withdrawals are conditioned on meeting specific criteria related to 
the purpose of the investment or savings account (for example, the 
provision of educational or medical benefits), or penalties apply to 
withdrawals made before such criteria are met; and 
(iv) Annual contributions are limited to $50,000 or less, applying the rules 
set forth in paragraph C of Section VII for account aggregation and 
currency translation. 
A Financial Account that otherwise satisfies the requirements of 
subparagraph C(17)(b)(iv) will not fail to satisfy such requirements solely 
because such Financial Account may receive assets or funds transferred 
from one or more Financial Accounts that meet the requirements of 
subparagraph C(17)(a) or (b) or from one or more retirement or pension 
funds that meet the requirements of any of subparagraphs B(5) through 
(7). 
 
(c) A life insurance contract with a coverage period that will end before 
the insured individual attains age 90, provided that the contract satisfies 
the following requirements: 
(i) Periodic premiums, which do not decrease over time, are payable at 
least annually during the period the contract is in existence or until the 
insured attains age 90, whichever is shorter; 
(ii) The contract has no contract value that any person can access (by 
withdrawal, loan, or otherwise) without terminating the contract; 
(iii) The amount (other than a death benefit) payable upon cancellation 
or termination of the contract cannot exceed the aggregate premiums 
paid for the contract, less the sum of mortality, morbidity, and expense 
charges (whether or not actually imposed) for the period or periods of 
the contract’s existence and any amounts paid prior to the cancellation 
or termination of the contract; and 
(iv) The contract is not held by a transferee for value. 
 
(d) An account that is held solely by an estate if the documentation for 
such account includes a copy of the deceased’s will or death certificate. 
(e) An account, which includes a trust account, established in connection 
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with any of the following: 
(i) A court order or judgment. 
(ii) A sale, exchange, or lease of real or personal property, provided that 
the account satisfies the following requirements: 
(aa) The account is funded solely with a down payment, earnest money, 
deposit in an amount appropriate to secure an obligation directly related 
to the transaction, or a similar payment, or is funded with a Financial 
Asset that is deposited in the account in connection with the sale, 
exchange, or lease of the property; 
(bb) The account is established and used solely to secure the obligation 
of the purchaser to pay the purchase price for the property, the seller to 
pay any contingent liability, or the lessor or lessee to pay for any 
damages relating to the leased property as agreed under the lease; 
(cc) The assets of the account, including the income earned thereon, will 
be paid or otherwise distributed for the benefit of the purchaser, seller, 
lessor, or lessee (including to satisfy such person’s obligation) when the 
property is sold, exchanged, or surrendered, or the lease terminates; 
(dd) The account is not a margin or similar account established in 
connection with a sale or exchange of a Financial Asset; and 
(ee) The account is not associated with an account described in 
subparagraph C(17)(f). 
(iii) An obligation of a Financial Institution servicing a loan secured by real 
property to set aside a portion of a payment solely to facilitate the 
payment of taxes or insurance related to the real property at a later time. 
(iv) An obligation of a Financial Institution solely to facilitate the payment 
of taxes at a later time. 
(f) A Depository Account that satisfies the following requirements: 
(i) The account exists solely because a customer makes a payment in 
excess of a balance due with respect to a credit card or other revolving 
credit facility and the overpayment is not immediately returned to the 
customer; and 
(ii) Beginning on or before 1 March 2016, the Financial Institution 
implements policies and procedures either to prevent a customer from 
making an overpayment in excess of $50,000, or to ensure that any 
76 
 
customer overpayment in excess of $50,000 is refunded to the customer 
within 60 days, in each case applying the rules set forth in paragraph C of 
Section VII for currency translation. For this purpose, a customer 
overpayment does not refer to credit balances to the extent of disputed 
charges but does include credit balances resulting from merchandise 
returns. 
(g) any other account that presents a low risk of being used to evade tax, 
has substantially similar characteristics to any of the accounts described 
in subparagraphs C(17)(a) through (f), and included in the list of Non-
Reporting Financial Institutions referred to the Regulations as an 
Excluded Account, provided that the status of such account as an 
Excluded Account does not frustrate the purposes of the Common 
Reporting Standard. (s. 8, Para. C, ss. 17(a-g)) 
Lower Value 
accounts 
 
A Low Value account is defined as a pre-existing individual financial 
account with an aggregate balance or value as of 29th February 2016 that 
does not exceed $1,000,000. (s. 8, Para. C, ss. 14) 
High Value 
accounts 
 
A High Value account means a pre-existing individual financial account 
with an aggregate balance or value that exceeds $1,000,000 as of 29th 
February 2016 or the last day of February of any subsequent reporting 
period. (s. 8, Para. C, ss. 15) 
Pre-existing 
account 
A financial account maintained by a reporting financial institution as of 
29th February 2016. (s. 8, Para. C, ss. 9) 
New account A financial account maintained by a reporting financial institution opened 
on or after 1 March 2016. (s. 8, Para. C, ss. 10) 
Pre-existing 
individual 
account 
A pre-existing account held by one or more individuals.  
(s. 8, Para. C, ss. 11) 
Pre-existing 
Entity account 
A pre-existing account held by one or more Entities.  
(s. 8, Para. C, ss. 13) 
New entity 
account 
A new account held by one or more entities. (s. 8, Para. C, ss. 16) 
Change in Includes any change that results in the addition of information relevant 
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circumstances to a person’s status or otherwise conflicts with such a person’s status. (s. 
9, Para. A, ss. 1) 
Documentary 
evidence 
This includes the following: 
a) A certificate of residence issued by an authorised government body 
(for example, a government or agency thereof, or a municipality) of 
the jurisdiction in which the payee claims to be a resident. 
b) With respect to an individual, any valid identification issued by an 
authorised government body (for example, a government or agency 
thereof, or a municipality), that includes the individual’s name and is 
typically used for identification purposes. 
c) With respect to an Entity, any official documentation issued by an 
authorized government body (for example, a government or agency 
thereof, or a municipality) that includes the name of the Entity and 
either the address of its principal office in the jurisdiction in which it 
claims to be a resident or the jurisdiction in which the Entity was 
incorporated or organised. 
d) Any audited financial statement, third-party credit report, 
bankruptcy filing, or securities regulator’s report.  
(s. 8, Para. E, ss. 6(a-d)) 
Documentary 
evidence of pre-
existing entity 
accounts 
With respect to a pre-existing entity Account, an FI may use as 
documentary evidence any records with respect to the entity that was  
1) determined based on a standardised industry coding system;  
2) recording by the FI consistent with its normal business practices for 
purposes of anti-money laundering (AML)/know your client (KYC) 
procedures or another regulatory purposes (other than for tax 
purposes); and 
3) implemented by the reporting financial institution prior to the date 
used to classify the Financial Account as a Pre-existing Account, 
provided that the FI does not know or does not have reason to know 
that such classification is incorrect or unreliable.  
The term ‘standardised industry coding system’ means a coding system 
used to classify establishments by business type for purposes other than 
tax purposes. (s. 9, Para. G, ss. 1-3) 
Trustee A trustee-documented trust is a trust that is a financial institution where 
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Documented 
Trust  
the trustee of the trust is itself a reporting financial institution and 
reports all the information required in respect of the Reportable 
Accounts of the trust. The trustee in such a case must report the 
information that the trustee-documented trust would have reported but 
for its status as a Non-reporting Financial Institution and must identify, 
when reporting, the trustee-documented trust in respect of which it 
fulfils the reporting and due diligence obligations. (RMB, n.d) 
Trustee The Trust property Control Act no 57 of 1998 defines a Trustee as any 
person (including the founder of a Trust) who acts as trustee by virtue of 
an authorisation granted by the Master of the high court and includes 
any person whose appointment as trustee is already of force and effect 
prior to the commencement of the Trust Property Control Act.  
Natural Person A human being, as opposed to an artificial or legal person like a company 
(Collins Dictionary of Law, 2006). 
Incapacity The absence of legal ability, competence, or qualifications  
(West’s Encyclopaedia of American Law, 2008).  
Juristic Person A body recognized by the law as being entitled to rights and duties in the 
same way as a natural or human person, the common example being a 
company (Collins Dictionary of Law, 2006). 
Activity Based 
Costing 
Cost accounting approach concerned with matching costs with activities 
(called cost drivers) that cause those costs (Business dictionary, (n.d)). 
Opportunity Cost A benefit, profit, or value that must be given up to acquire or achieve 
something else. Since every resource (land, money, time, etc.) can be put 
to alternative uses, every action, choice, or decision has an associated 
opportunity cost (Business dictionary, (n.d)). 
 
 
